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PROFESSOR NIMMER MEETS PROFESSOR SCHAUER
(AND OTHERS): AN ANALYSIS OF “DEFINITIONAL
BALANCING” AS A METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING
THE “VISIBLE BOUNDARIES OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT”
Norman T. Deutsch*

I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the fact that it is phrased in absolutist terms (Congress and,
by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment, the States “shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”1), the First Amendment
does not “give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever
or wherever he pleases or to use any form of address in any
circumstances that he chooses.”2 Indeed, as Professor Schauer has
observed, there are large categories of “what would be called ‘speech’ in
ordinary language” that are not encompassed within the First
Amendment.3 He notes that the “important” difference between speech
*

Professor of Law, Albany Law School, Union University. The author wishes to thank Catherine
Bonventre, Class of 2005, and Julie Ovicher, Class of 2006, for valuable research and technical
support.
1. U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV.
2. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971). See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (“[T]he right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances.”).
3. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of The First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1773, 1771 (2004) [hereinafter Schauer,
Boundaries]. Professor Schauer refers to criminal law, “securities regulation, antitrust law, and
labor law;” the law of copyright and trademark, sexual harassment, fraud, evidence, regulation of
professionals; and a considerable portion of tort law. Id. at 1783-84. Further,
[i]f we do not restrict our inquiry to propositional speech—that is, if we include the
speech by which we make wills, enter into contracts, render verdicts, create conspiracies,
consecrate marriages, admit to our crimes, post warnings, and do much else—it becomes
still clearer that the speech with which the First Amendment is even slightly concerned is
but a small subset of the speech that pervades every part of our lives.
Id. at 1784. See also Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three
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that is included and speech that is excluded is “the . . . distinction
between coverage and protection.”4 Speech that is included within the
First Amendment may still be subject to regulation, but the regulation
must meet First Amendment standards. However, regulation of speech
that is excluded is not subject to First Amendment analysis.5
Professor Schauer also argues that “existing normative theories
seem of little relevance to achieving a descriptive understanding of how
the First Amendment came to look the way it does and how it came to
include what it includes and exclude what it excludes.”6 He suggests
“that the most logical explanation of the actual boundaries of the First
Amendment might come less from an underlying theory of the First
Amendment and more from the political, sociological, cultural,
historical, psychological, and economic milieu in which the First
Amendment exists and out of which it developed.”7 Nonetheless, once
the issue has reached the level of litigation, a practical methodology is
needed to determine what is a First Amendment speech case and what is
not, or to use Professor Schauer’s words, to determine “[t]he [v]isual
[b]oundaries of the First Amendment[].”8
Professor Nimmer used the phrase “definitional balancing” to
describe what he thought was the appropriate methodology for the
United States Supreme Court to use in “defining which forms of speech
are to be regarded as ‘speech’ within the meaning of the First
Amendment.”9 However, the Court has never explicitly said that it
Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981) [hereinafter Schauer, Categories].
4. Schauer, Categories, supra note 3, at 275-76.
5. See Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 3, at 1769-73. However, this is true only to the
extent that such speech is proscribed, or otherwise regulated, based on the underlying reasons why
such speech is excluded from the First Amendment. See infra notes 142-52 and accompanying text.
6. Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 3, at 1787.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1774. Professor Schauer’s reference is to the fact that although many of the
boundaries of the First Amendment are “[invisible] because they have been taken for granted[,] . . .
the boundaries of the First Amendment have been highly visible” with respect to those categories of
speech that have often been the subject of litigation See id. at 1774-77.
9. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied
to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 942 & n. 24 (1968) (citing “various”
authorities as precursors “of the doctrine of definitional balancing”). Definitional balancing is
sometimes referred to as “categorical balancing.” See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1138 n.175 (2005); John Rothchild, Menacing Speech and the First
Amendment: A Functional Approach to Incitement That Threatens, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 207, 209
(1999); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation: Illusion and Reality, 41 WAYNE ST. L.
REV. 135, 162-63 (1994) [hereinafter Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation]; Alan Brownstein,
How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Standard Analysis in Constitutional
Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L. REV. 867, 956 n.355 (1994); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47 & n.3 (1987). In addition the term “categorization” has been
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applies such a methodology. Nonetheless, Professor Nimmer found its
application implicit in the Court’s decisions.10
Used as a methodology for defining the scope of speech that the
First Amendment includes and excludes, definitional balancing involves
striking a balance between competing speech and governmental
regulatory interests,11 based on First Amendment values,12 and the
creation of rules that can be applied in subsequent cases.13 Professor
Nimmer viewed definitional balancing as a middle ground between
absolutism (in the sense that “literally all speech is protected”)14 and ad
hoc balancing (a case by case weighing of the competing interests “for
the purpose of determining which litigant deserves to prevail in a given
case”).15 Commentators, however, are divided over its nature,
desirability, and application.
Some commentators view definitional balancing as a form of
absolutist approach to the First Amendment,16 while others take the
used to describe what amounts to definitional balancing. See Keith Werhan, The Liberalization of
Freedom of Speech on a Conservative Court, 80 IOWA L. REV. 51, 53-59 (1994) (using both the
terms “categorization” and “categorical balancing”); John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Study in
the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482,
1500 & n.74 (1975). However, the term “categorization” has also been used to describe the creation
of “a priori” categories in contrast to “[d]efinitional or categorical balancing [which] makes use of
categories, though not a priori one.” Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low Value Speech, 48 SMU
L. Rev. 297, 343 (1995) [hereinafter Shaman, Low Value Speech]. To add to the confusion,
Professor Redish, in contradiction to Professor Shaman, has described “categorical balancing” as
the balancing of “competing interests in an a priori manner.” Martin H. Redish, Unlawful Advocacy
and Free Speech Theory: Rethinking the Lessons of the McCarthy Era, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 9, 17
(2004).
10. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 943, 949.
11. The terms “government interests” and “societal interests” are often used interchangeably
in the First Amendment context. See Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry Into the
Foundations and Limits of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1307 (1998); T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 981 n.231 (1987) (when
he wrote this article, Dean Aleinikoff was a Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law
School; he has been Dean at Georgetown University Law Center since 2004).
12. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 948-50. See infra Part III.A. See also DONALD ALEXANDER
DOWNS, NAZIS IN SKOKIE 7 (1985) (“Definitional Balancing . . . entails establishing the basic types
of speech which are consistent with the First Amendment’s purposes, and then protecting these
forms of speech as fully and consistently as is possible.”).
13. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 944-45.
14. Id. at 941.
15. Id. at 942. See generally id. at 935-42.
16. See WILLIAM COHEN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1291 (12th ed. 2005) (“For a
‘definitional balancer,’ the proper rule in a particular context may be one of absolute protection for
speech. . . .”); Heyman, supra note 11, at 1307-09, 1309 n. 180 (referring to definitional balancing
as a form of absolutism); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 792
(2d ed.1988) (same); Ely, supra note 9, 1482, 1500 n.74 (same); Schauer, Categories, supra note 3,
at 274 (same). Cf. Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30
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opposite view and think that there is little difference between
definitional balancing and ad hoc balancing.17 Commentators are also
divided on whether definitional balancing is a flexible methodology or
whether it is too inflexible.18 Additionally, they disagree on the
propriety of the underlying methodology to the extent that it is perceived
as involving a comparative weighing of competing interests.19 The
methodology itself is often described as a technique that limits the scope
UCLA L. REV. 671, 673, 674 n.9 (1983) (“Definitional balancing is theoretically distinguishable
from non-absolutists categorical approaches” but “[t]he distinction . . . may be more methodological
than substantive. . . .”); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND
ROMANCE 12 (1990) (“[T]he absolute preference for rules – definitional balancing – is overly
absolute.”).
17. Isaac Molnar, Resurrecting the Bad Tendency Test to Combat Instructional Speech:
Militias Beware, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1369 n.243 (1998) (asserting that “definitional balancing
will essentially break down into ad hoc balancing as soon as the Court is willing to consider other
interests of different degree from their previous decisions”); SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 16-17
(arguing that the difference between definitional balancing and ad hoc balancing “is not sharp”);
Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 980 (asserting that the distinction between ad hoc balancing and
definitional balancing is “artificial”); Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment and the Burger Court,
68 CAL. L. REV. 422, 439 (1980) (maintaining that “[w]hile the traditional criticisms of balancing
apply more directly to ad hoc [balancing] than definitional balancing, the distinction between the
two is of doubtful significance in formulating First Amendment doctrine”).
18. Compare Schlag, supra note 16, at 674 n.9 (flexible) (“Definitional balancing does not
provide . . . a finished product: it remains subject to change if the state interest asserted prove to be
novel and substantially less compelling or substantially more compelling than those state interest
asserted in past balancing acts.”) with SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 15 (inflexible) (“The particular
weakness of Nimmer’s methodology is its inflexibility.”); Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 979
(inflexible) (discussing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)).
19. Commentators questioning the desirability of balancing as a methodology include
Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 944 (“serious problems in the mechanics of balancing” exist);
Emerson, supra note 17, at 439 (arguing that “legal doctrines should be designed to formulate
categories based solely upon the characteristics of the conduct and value structure underlying the
first amendment” ); David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests:
Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1524 (1992)
(asserting that considering the government’s interest in defining the scope of the constitutional right
is “contrary to the fundamental operating assumptions of the Constitution”); Heyman, supra note
11, at 1279-80 (recommending that “First Amendment issues [should be] . . . conceived of . . . as
conflicts of rights . . . [not] as clashes between free speech and ‘social interest’”); Frederick
Schauer, Commentary: The Aim and the Target in Free Speech Methodology, 83 NW. U. L. REV.
562, 562 n.4 (1989) (favoring an approach that seeks to determine of the scope of the First
Amendment by “asking whether this is an act, or an example of a type of act, that triggers the
concerns of the first amendment . . . independently of an evaluation of the desirability of regulating
that act”).
Other commentators think that balancing is an appropriate mode of First Amendment
analysis. See, e.g., Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 9, at 175 (“[B]alancing is the
only sound way to interpret the Constitution.”); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment And
Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV.
1212, 1251-52 (1983) (the Court “has been right in . . . balanc[ing] the impact of challenged
regulations on first amendment values against the seriousness of the evil that the state seeks to
mitigate”).
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of First Amendment protection,20 and some commentators think that it
limits, or at least has the potential to limit, too much speech.21 On the
other hand, others view definitional balancing as being speech
protective,22 and some, at least implicitly, believe that it protects too

20. See Note, Content Regulation and The Dimensions of Free Expression, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1854, 1858 n.28 (1983) (“‘[D]efinitional balancing’ . . . exclude[s] from protection categories of
expression whose social harm outweighs their value.”); William D. Deane, COPA and Community
Standards on the Internet: Should the People of Maine and Mississippi Dictate the Obscenity
Standards in Las Vegas and New York, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 245, 249 n.24 (2001) (“The
definitional approach simply categorizes certain speech as unprotected by the First Amendment
because, as a rule the government’s interest outweighs the value of those particular classes of
speech.”); Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrine in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647, 671 (2002) (“Under that
approach, a class of speech should not be protected if its social value is outweighed by the social
harm that it causes.”); Yvonne C. Ocrant, Constitutional Challenge to Encryption Export
Regulations: Software Is Speechless, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 503, 522-23 (1998) (“[W]hen applying
definitional balancing, the Court will uphold a regulation of speech if the Court is convinced that the
class of speech in question is sufficiently harmful, even without a showing of actual harm.”); Martin
H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 624 & n.115 (1982) (definitional
balancing “allows fully protected speech to be superseded by overriding social interest”); Rothchild,
supra note 9, at 209 (“Definitional, or categorical balancing, involves designating a particular
category of speech[;] . . . [t]his . . . approach usually results in reduced protection for speech.”);
Shaman, Low Value Speech, supra note 9, at 331 (“Definitional balancing is the primary method the
Court uses for giving less constitutional protection to speech, such as libel, that the Court feels has
less than full constitutional value.”); Werhan, supra note 9, at 56 (“As the Burger Court settled onto
place, that speech-protective spirit dissipated and the Justices embraced categorization as a method
to restrict First Amendment protection.”).
21. Faigman, supra note 19, at 1523 (“Because the threshold question regarding the existence
of constitutional rights has become infected with the government’s countervailing interests, those
individual rights have lost much of their vitality, if not their very existence.”); Schauer, Categories,
supra note 3, at 276 (“One danger of definitional-absolutist theories . . . is that [they may have the
effect of] “constrict[ing freedom of speech].”); Note supra note 20, 1858 n.28 (“‘[D]efinitional
balancing’ which would exclude from protection categories of expression whose social harm
outweighs their value is inadequate because it requires weighing interests of different sorts and
violates autonomy of expression by restricting speech on the basis of its consequences.”).
22. See Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 987 (“[B]alancing has proven to be a robust
methodology for the creation and extension of rights.”); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny In
Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297, 353 n.242 (1997) (definitional balancing lines are
drawn “narrowly” so as to afford “some constitutional protection” to “even seemingly ‘unprotected
speech’”); Ronald A. Cass, Mellville B. Nimmer Symposium: Article: The Perils of Positive
Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1405, 1475 n.206 (1987) (“The focus of definitional balancing . . . traditionally has been the
mechanics of protecting speech. . . .”); Ely, supra note 9, at 1500 (“Categorization . . . [is] “more
likely to protect expression in crisis times.”); Rosemary C. Salomone, Public Forum Doctrine and
the Perils of Categorical Thinking: Lessons From Lamb’s Chapel, 24 N.M. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1994)
(definitional balancing is a “categorical or formulaic approach . . . [that is] considered to be
generally speech protective”); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH, § 2:12, at 2-7 & n.1 (3d ed. 2004) (describing definitional balancing as being more speech
protective than ad hoc balancing); TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-2, at 793-94 (same).
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much speech.23 Sometimes commentators cannot even agree on whether
definitional balancing was actually applied in a given case.24 Others do
not object to the methodology as such, but are critical of where the Court
has drawn the definitional line in a particular context.25 Finally, at least
one commentator thinks that the term “definitional balancing” is
potentially confusing;26 he uses the term “‘heightened scrutiny’” to
describe the process.27
This article examines definitional balancing as a methodology for
determining the “visible boundaries of the First Amendment.” More
specifically, it focuses on the Court’s use of definitional balancing, as a
technique for drawing definitional lines within categories of speech, to
distinguish between speech that is included within the First Amendment,
and speech that is excluded so that it may be proscribed based on its
23. See, e.g., Heyman, supra note 11, at 1279 (“[F]ree speech is a right that is limited by the
fundamental rights of other individuals and the community as a whole.”); Note, supra note 20, at
1862 (implying that the First Amendment only protects speech that is necessary “to promote the
realization of ‘man’s spiritual nature’”). See also infra note 361 and accompanying text.
24. Compare Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1001 (stating that the Court did not balance in N.Y.
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)) with Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity In First
Amendment Law, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1291, 1349-50 (2004) (stating that the Court applied
definitional balancing in Sullivan) and Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of Defamation:
Putting the Horse Behind the Cart, 35 AM. U. L. REV 3, 8-11, 64 (1985) (same) and Nimmer, supra
note 9, at 942, 949 (stating that the Court implicitly applied definitional balancing in Sullivan).
25. See Lori Weiss, Is the True Threats Doctrine Threatening the First Amendment? Planned
Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists Signals the
Need to Remedy an Inadequate Doctrine, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1283, 1286 (2004) (there is “a need
to revise true threats jurisprudence to cure its deficiencies”); O. Lee Reed, The State is Strong But I
am Weak: Why the ‘Imminent Lawless Action’ Standard Should Not Apply to Targeted Speech that
Threatens Individuals with Violence, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 207 (2000) (the imminent lawless action
standard “is ill-suited as a general category defining harm both in the context of indictment or threat
against the state and in the context of incitement, threat, intimidation, or harassment against
individuals”); Rothchild, supra note 9, at 223-24 (the definitional line should be drawn so as to
exclude “menacing” speech from the First Amendment); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case
for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 492 n.250 (1999) (in the context of a right of
publicity, “[a]ttempts to predefine categories of use become so convoluted as to sacrifice the clarity
that is the greatest benefit of a definitional approach”); Alon Harel, Bigotry, Pornography, and the
First Amendment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1887 (1992) (“Racist and pornographic speech . . . should be
seen as falling into a comprehensive category of unprotected speech.”); Levine, supra note 24, at 14
(the definitional line the Court drew in defamation cases involving public figures “serves neither the
first amendment guarantee of robust public debate nor the states’ interest in safeguarding individual
reputation”). Even Professor Nimmer thought the Court drew the definitional line in the wrong
place in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), and in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 948 n.39, 956-67.
26. SMOLLA, supra note 22, § 2:12, at 2-7 & n.1.
27. Id. at 2-7. In addition, Professor Schauer refers to “heightened standards” in referring to a
case in which the Court appeared to have applied definitional balancing. Schauer, Boundaries,
supra note 3, at 1776 (“[L]ibelous utterances are now tested against standards heightened by First
Amendment coverage.”).
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content.28 Part II describes definitional balancing in Professor Nimmer’s
terms. Part III discusses the Court’s application of definitional balancing
and the issues raised by commentators.
II. PROFESSOR NIMMER’S ANALYSIS OF DEFINITIONAL BALANCING
Professor Nimmer viewed “definitional balancing”29 as an
alternative to both absolutism and ad hoc balancing. He rejected
absolutism, in the sense “that the First Amendment must be interpreted
and applied with absolute literalness,” as being clearly untrue30 because
the laws regulating such things as copyrights, espionage, monopolies,
and perjury are largely unaffected by the First Amendment even though
they may involve speech.31 Since the First Amendment does not
encompass all speech, some technique must be used to determine what is
included and what is excluded. Professor Nimmer asserted that “[i]f
such selection is to turn on rational rather than arbitrary considerations,
it is obvious the selection process requires a balancing of competing
interests.”32 However, he thought that in making this determination, it
was “essential” that courts use definitional balancing rather than ad hoc
balancing “if freedom of speech is to be meaningful as constitutional
doctrine.”33
As Professor Nimmer saw it, the differences between the two types
of balancing include the process that is used, the fact that definitional
balancing results in rules that can be applied in later cases, and that
definitional balancing is likely to be more speech protective than ad hoc
balancing.34 He illustrated these differences in the context of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.35 In that case, the Montgomery Alabama police
28. The application of definitional balancing in other contexts is beyond the scope of this
article. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber and John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1219, 122630, 1235-37, 1242 (1984) (arguing that while definitional balancing may be “appropriate” for
defining categories of speech that are excluded from the First Amendment, it is inappropriate for
regulating speech with respect to “certain locations, media, or speakers”). Professor Shiffrin has
also argued that definitional balancing is not the appropriate methodology for resolving all First
Amendment issues. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 12, 15; Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 1253. See
also infra notes 389-98 and accompanying text.
29. See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 942, 944 (using the language “balancing process on the
definitional.”).
30. Id. at 935.
31. Id. at 937.
32. Id. at 941-42.
33. Id. at 967.
34. See generally id. at 939-45.
35. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964).
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commissioner brought a libel action against the New York Times for
publishing a paid civil rights advertisement that allegedly contained
defamatory statements.36 The plaintiff obtained a jury verdict based on
common law defamation.37 The Court reversed, holding that the First
Amendment requires a “rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not.”38
According to Professor Nimmer, the Court in Sullivan “implicitly”
engaged in balancing “but it was not ad hoc balancing.”39 In ad hoc
balancing, the Court weighs the competing interests “presented in the
particular circumstances of the case before the court40 . . . for the
purpose of determining which litigant deserves to prevail in the
particular case.”41 Thus, “[i]f the Court had followed the ad hoc
approach, it would have inquired whether ‘under the particular
circumstances presented’ the interest of the defendants in publishing
their particular advertisement outweighed . . . the seriousness of the
particular resulting injury to the plaintiff’s reputation.”42 However, this
is not what the Court did; instead, it engaged in definitional balancing.
In definitional balancing, in contrast to ad hoc balancing, “the Court
employs balancing not for the purpose of determining which litigant
deserves to prevail in the particular case, but only for the purpose of
defining which forms of speech are to be regarded as ‘speech’ within the
meaning of the first amendment.”43 This inquiry takes place at a higher
level of generalization. The question is whether “generally . . . the
speech values”44 at stake outweigh the government’s interest in
regulating the type of speech at issue.45 Thus, the question in Sullivan
was not whether “the interest of the [particular] defendants in publishing
36. Id. at 256.
37. Id. Under the state’s defamation law, the defendant is strictly liable for defamatory
statements and general damages are presumed even in the absence of proof of loss. See id. at 267.
Punitive damages may also be awarded. See id. If “‘libel per se’ has been established the defendant
has no defense as to stated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were true in all their
particulars.” Id.
38. Id. at 279-80.
39. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 943.
40. Id. at 944.
41. Id. at 942.
42. Id. at 943-44.
43. Id. at 942.
44. Id. at 945, 950.
45. See id. at 950-51.
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their particular advertisement outweighed the interest of the [particular]
plaintiff in the protection of his reputation.”46 Instead, the question was
“whether the speech values justify the Court in sweeping away most of
the law of defamation where the statement is made against a public
figure.”47
As Professor Nimmer saw it, the “profound difference between ad
hoc and definitional balancing lies in the fact that a rule emerges from
definitional balancing which can be employed in future cases without the
occasion for further weighing of interests.”48 Thus, in Sullivan, the
Court created a rule that false statements, which injure the reputation of
public officials, are constitutionally privileged unless they are made with
actual malice; “that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.”49
However, “ad hoc balancing by hypothesis means that there is no
rule to be applied, but only interests to be weighed.”50 Thus, “[i]n
advance of a final adjudication by the highest court a given speaker has
no standard by which he can measure whether his interest in speaking
will be held of greater or lesser weight than the competing interests
which opposes his speech.”51 Professor Nimmer argued that while there
can never “be complete certainty as how a given rule will be applied in a
new situation, if there is no rule at all then there is no certainty at all.”52
As he viewed it, “[t]he absence of certainty in the law is always
unfortunate, but is particularly pernicious where speech is concerned
because it tends to deter all but the courageous (not necessarily the most
rational) from entering the market place of ideas.”53 However, the
creation of a rule through definitional balancing “offers some measure of
certainty [to First Amendment law] and minimizes speech deterrence.”54
It creates “a standard by which” a speaker “can measure” whether his
speech is constitutionally protected.55
In addition, Professor Nimmer argued that definitional balancing is
46. Id. at 943.
47. Id. at 950. See also id. at 943-44, 949-51. The Court focused on the fact that the speech at
issue was a matter of public concern. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270-83. Professor Nimmer argued
that the speech values of “self expression” and “freedom of speech . . . [as] a necessary safety
valve” were at also at stake in Sullivan. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 949.
48. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 944-45.
49. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 943.
50. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 939.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 945.
55. See id. at 939.
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likely to result in greater protection for speech than ad hoc balancing.
With respect to legislative encroachments, he noted that since
definitional balancing creates a rule that defines the scope of the First
Amendment, “such a rule should continue to be applicable
notwithstanding subsequent enactment of new legislation which in some
different manner attempts to protect an interest inimical to speech.”56
With respect to the judiciary, Professor Nimmer argued that ad hoc
balancing may skew the result in favor of the interest in regulating
speech. This is true for two reasons. First, “[g]iven the assumption in
our national heritage that most speech is to be tolerated, it is only those
who espouse the most unpopular ideas, those against whom feelings run
the highest that are likely to be the subject of repressive laws, and only
they are likely to be prosecuted.”57 In his view, “[i]t is too much to
expect that our judges will be entirely untouched, consciously or
otherwise, by strong popular feelings—feelings that have more than
once reached the point of national hysteria—when they come to engage
in the ‘delicate and difficult task’ of weighing the competing interests.”58
Consequently, “at the very time when the right of freedom of speech
becomes crucial, the scales may become unbalanced . . . [in favor of] the
interest which opposes the speech.”59 Secondly, ad hoc balancing may
skew the result in favor of the interest in regulating speech because often
a “court must balance the interest in speech against the compelling force
of a particular legislative judgment as molded in law which has been
violated.”60 In such cases, “the court is likely to be swayed by their
judgment in the weighing of interests.”61
However, Professor Nimmer maintained that the creation of
definitional balancing “rule[s] makes it more likely that the balance
originally struck will continue to be observed despite new and perhaps
otherwise irresistible pressures.”62
He “concede[d] that neither
definitional balancing nor any other technique can offer absolute
assurance that a given court under sufficient internal or external pressure
in some ‘hard’ case will not depart from a definitional rule.”63 However,
he argued that “definitional balancing can insulate a judge from legally
irrelevant pressures to a considerable degree if the judge wishes such
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 945.
Id. at 940.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 945.
Id.
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insulation.”64
Professor Nimmer also conceded “that, in vacua, ad hoc balancing
is more likely to consider fine nuances and therefore produce a more just
result.”65 However, he argued that “this likelihood may be offset by the
fact that in ad hoc balancing weight is likely to be given only to the
particular speech involved and not to ‘speech’ generally, so that the
speech side of the balance may be underweighed when compared with
the immediate impact of a particular injury.”66 Furthermore, since
speech cases do not arise in a vacuum, the “likelihood [that ad hoc
balancing would reach a more equitable result] would be present only in
an ideal world where ad hoc balancing would not be subject to distortion
from public and legislative pressures.”67 Thus, in his view “[t]he
argument that ad hoc balancing is preferable to definitional balancing
because the former permits a more sensitive appreciation of the equities
in each particular case may be more easily made in non-speech cases
where public passions do not generally ride as high.”68
III. THE APPLICATION OF DEFINITIONAL BALANCING AND THE VIEWS
OF COMMENTATORS
As Professor Schauer has noted, “[most] examples [of] conduct that
would or might be speech in ordinary language but that is not speech in
the eyes of the Constitution . . . are rarely if ever litigated.”69 However,
in those areas that have been subject to litigation, the Court, without
explicit acknowledgment, has applied definitional balancing as a
technique for drawing definitional lines within categories of speech to
distinguish between speech that is included within the First Amendment
and speech that is excluded, so that it may be proscribed based on its
content. For the most part, the Court has done so in the way that
Professor Nimmer described it; the Court has sought to define the outer
limits of the First Amendment by striking a balance between the
competing interests based on First Amendment values.70 However, as
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 947.
69. Schauer, Categories, supra note 3, at 269 (referring to antitrust laws); see also Schauer,
Boundaries, supra note 3, 1771, 1774 (mentioning criminal law, securities regulation, antitrust law,
and labor law; the law of copyright and trademark, sexual harassment, fraud, evidence, regulation
of professionals, and a considerable portion of tort law).
70. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text; see infra notes 99-343 and accompanying
text.
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mentioned above, commentators are divided over its nature, desirability,
and application.
A. To What Extent Does Definitional Balancing Involve Balancing?
As Professor Nimmer explained, definitional balancing is different
than ad hoc balancing. In ad hoc balancing, the Court asks whether, in
the context of the specific facts of the case, the government’s regulatory
interest outweighs the particular plaintiff’s speech interest for the
purpose of deciding which party should win.71 Whereas in definitional
balancing the Court seeks to determine the extent to which the particular
category of speech at issue is encompassed within the First Amendment
for the purpose of creating rules that can be applied in later cases.72
However, definitional balancing is often described as a methodology that
excludes speech from the First Amendment “if its social value is
outweighed by the social harm that it causes.”73 This conception equates
definitional balancing with ad hoc balancing in the sense of “the
identification, valuation, and comparison of competing interests,”74
albeit at a higher level of generalization than the latter.75 Under this
71. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
73. See Heyman, supra note 20, at 671 (2002) (“Under that approach, a class of speech should
not be protected if its social value is outweighed by the social harm that it causes.”); see also other
sources cited supra note 20. Cf. Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech
Paradigm, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 411, 435-36 (1992) (“Communitarian interest may represent
important social values . . . and may occasionally outweigh free speech values in certain limited
circumstances.”).
74. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 945.
75. See Bhagwat, supra note 22, at 353 n.242 (“Definitional balancing requires the Court to
balance free speech interests against the strength of government objectives with regard to an entire
category of speech, rather than with regard to specific burden on speech, as is the case with ad hoc
balancing.”); Daniel O. Conkle, Free Speech and the Indiana Constitution: First Thoughts on Price
v. State: The Indiana Supreme Court’s Emerging Free Speech Doctrine, 69 IND. L.J. 857, 858
(1994) (“[T]he judicial definition of unprotected categories is almost inevitably based upon a more
abstract balancing process, one that evaluates an entire type or category of speech and weighs the
value of this speech against the governmental interest that might support its regulation.”); Peter
Krug, Symposium: The Life and Jurisprudence of Justice Thurgood Marshall: Justice Marshall and
New Media Law: Rules Over Standards?, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 13, 19 (1994) (“[A]t the definition
stage . . . categori[es] [are] defined by the type of facts presented, the constitutional right at issue,
or the nature of the right or interest advanced by the government.”); Reed, supra note 25, at 185
(stating that in “definitional balancing . . . the Court balances speech values against competing
interests only in an initial case that defines a category of speech which is constitutionally
unprotected”); Salomone, supra note 22, at 14-15 (stating that in “definitional balancing . . . the
Court balances the weight of the right against the state interest at the macro level and applies the
result to all future cases”); Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 9, at 161-62 (stating
that the balancing of the “pertinent” interests “focuses on the general category rather than on the
particular instance involved in the case”) ; Douglas Wells, Thurgood Marshall and “Individual Self-
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view, the Court identifies the First Amendment values and the
government regulatory interest at stake “and reaches a decision or
constructs a rule of constitutional law by explicitly or implicitly
assigning values to the identified interest.”76 In such balancing, “[t]he
focus is directly on the interests or factors themselves[;] [e]ach interest
seeks recognition on its own and forces a head–to–head comparison with
the competing interests.”77
Dean Aleinikoff is the principal critic of balancing as a process of
valuation and comparison. He maintains that in this regard there is little
difference between ad hoc and definitional balancing,78 and they are both
subject to the same criticisms.79 These include both “an internal
critique”80 and “an external critique.”81
His internal critique relates to “how interests are identified, valued
and compared.”82 He asserts that “the Court has no objective criteria for
valuing or comparing the interests at stake.”83 Furthermore, in theory,
“[t]he task [in balancing] is seen as requiring the consideration of all
relevant interests, whether traceable to the Constitution or to society at
Realization” in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 61 TENN. L. REV. 237, 243 (1993) (“Definitional
balancing . . . requires the judge to weigh the values underlying the particular category of speech
against the asserted government interest.”).
76. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 945.
77. Id. For commentators who conceive of definitional balancing as a comparison and
evaluation of competing interests, see sources cited supra notes 20, 75. See also Jeffrey Blum, The
Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Approach to Freedom of Speech and
Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1301-02 (1983) (stating that the Court, in applying
“definitional balancing[,] . . . contrasts the societal benefit of protecting a given type of activity with
the costs entailed in the abandonment of regulatory interests sacrificed by according protection”);
Faigman, supra note 19, at 1536 (“[In] definitional balancing . . . the Court assesses the weight of
the right implicated by a particular government action against the gravity of the government’s
interest in acting.”); see also Emerson, supra note 17, at 439 (“Both [ad hoc and definitional]
balancing undertake to weigh the individual and social interests in free expression against other
interests of a different kind and therefore are subject to the same objections.”).
78. See Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 980 n.230. Dean Aleinikoff bases his assertion that
definitional and ad hoc balancing are similar on the fact that the Court has created different
definitional rules in defamation cases, based on the difference in the underlying facts. See infra Part
III.E.
79. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 948. See also Emerson, supra note 17, at 439 (“Both [ad hoc
and definitional] balancing undertake to weigh the individual and social interests in free expression
against other interest of a different kind, and therefore are subject to the same objections.”).
80. See Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 972-83.
81. See id. at 984-95.
82. Id. at 972.
83. Id. Dean Aleinikoff says that “[b]alancing must demand the development of a scale of
values external to the Justices’ personal preferences.” Id. at 973. However, although “[i]n the
search for an external scale . . . the modern Court has relied upon several sources that seem
sensible[,] [n]othing in the ‘external’ sources offers a clue about how to compare differently derived
values.” Id. at 974-75.
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large [but] . . . .in practice the Court never makes a full inventory of the
relevant interests,”84 and often fails to “place the interests of [all] holders
of the relevant interests . . . on the scale.”85 In addition, “[b]alancing
opinions typically pit individual against government interests, [but]
[t]his characterization . . . is arbitrary [because] [i]nterests may be
conceived of in both public and private terms.”86
He also argues that there are external issues with balancing that
“implicate[] deeper questions about the role of the Court and the nature
of judicial review.”87 First, there is the role of the Court in assigning
value to legislation.88 Second, “[b]alancing . . . undermine[s] our usual
understanding of constitutional law as an interpretive enterprise;”89
among other things, it “does not require the Court to develop and defend
a theoretical understanding of a constitutional provision.”90 Finally, he
asserts that balancing often “has the effect of distancing us from . . .
discourse . . . [on] the basic questions of social and political justice—
such as the meaning of liberty, fairness, and justice—through the
discussion of constitutional issues.”91
84. Id. at 977. He maintains that “taking balancing seriously would seem to demand the kind
of investigation of the world that courts are unable or unwilling to undertake.” Id. at 978.
85. Id. at 978. This would include non-parties, but Dean Aleinikoff says to include them
would result in “an unwieldy litigation process . . . and the cost of constitutional litigation would
skyrocket.” Id. Consequently, to “mak[e] balancing work, the Court has adopted a truncated form
that ought not to be acceptable to the conscientious balancer.” Id. at 978-79.
86. Id. at 981. Dean Aleinikoff argues that “[t]he individual interest in commutating one’s
ideas to others may also be stated as a societal interest in a diverse marketplace of ideas.” Id. Thus,
where “public and private interests appear on both sides, there is little sense in seeing the balance in
terms of individual versus government interests.” Id.
87. Id. at 984.
88. See id. at 984-86. He asserts that “[e]ven if the balancing court purports to accept the
value that the legislature places on its own output, it cannot simply factor the legislature’s
determination into a constitution calculus.” Id. at 986. Instead, “it must first convert the
constitutional value and the legislative value into a common currency.” Id. The problem is “[h]ow
does a court decide how ‘important’ a legislative or administrative policy is?” Aleinikoff, supra
note 11, at 986. He maintains that “[b]alancers . . . must suggest reasons why judgments assigning a
social value to legislation are within the capacity of courts.” Id.
89. Id. at 988. He says that [b]alancing is transforming constitutional discourse into a general
discussion of the reasonableness of government conduct.” Id. at 987. It also “undermines the
checking and validating functions of constitutional law.” Id. at 991.
90. Id. at 988. Instead, “the Court searches the landscape for interests implicated by the case,
identifies a few, and reaches a reasonable accommodation among them.” Aleinikoff, supra note 11,
at 988. By “so doing, the Court largely ignores the usual stuff of constitutional law interpretationthe investigation and manipulation of texts (such as constitutional language, prior cases, evenperhaps-our ‘ethical tradition’).” Id.
91. Id. at 988. This is so because “[i]n recent years – perhaps due to nagging criticisms about
the problem of assigning weights - the Court has resorted with increasing frequency to the jargon of
economics and policy science in an attempt to look non-wilful, scientific, and objective.” Id. at 992.
However:
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Furthermore, Dean Aleinikoff argues that balancing is not
necessary since other methodologies exist for resolving conflicts that
arise in constitutional cases that do not involve balancing.92 For
example, “‘exception[s]’” in constitutional cases “may best be
understood not as resulting from a balance but as resting upon a
principle internal to the constitutional provision” at issue.93 Other
commentators agree that, in defining the scope of the First Amendment,
the Court should not engage in balancing in the sense of a “head to head
comparison”94 of government and speech interests. Instead, the
determination should be made solely on whether the speech at issue is
consistent with First Amendment values.95 Such values are derived from
“the historical, political, and philosophical purposes that underlie the
First Amendment.”96 The Court may employ “a number of interpretive
techniques . . . [such as] text, structure, precedent, consequences, history,
intent, our ‘ethical tradition,’ [and] fundamental values,”97 but the
determination should be made “independently of an evaluation . . . of the
state’s regulatory goals.”98
The problem with this criticism is that, as a general rule,
definitional balancing, when used as a methodology for determining the
scope of the First Amendment speech clause, does not involve the kind
of balancing that Dean Aleinikoff and many other commentators ascribe

Scientifically styled opinions, written to answer charges of subjectivity, make us
spectators as the Court places the various interests on the scales. The weighing
mechanism remains a mystery, and the result is simply read off the machine. Scientific
balancing decisions are neither opinions nor arguments that can engage us; they are
demonstrations.
Id. at 993.
92. Id. at 998.
93. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1000.
94. Id. at 945.
95. See Schauer, supra note 19, at 562 n.4 (favoring an approach that seeks to determine of
the scope of the First Amendment by “asking whether this is an act, or an example of a type of act,
that triggers the concerns of the first amendment . . . independently of an evaluation of the
desirability of regulating that act”); Emerson, supra note 17, at 439 (similar); Faigman, supra note
19, at 1524 (asserting that considering the government’s interest in defining the scope of the a
constitutional right is “contrary to the fundamental operating assumptions of the Constitution”).
96. See Geoffrey Stone, Content Regulations and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 194 (1983).
97. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1002. See also Faigman, supra note 19, at 1530-31 (arguing
that in determining whether a constitutional right exists, the Court should look primarily to the text,
but may also look at “supplemental authorities . . . as necessary to fill gaps in the text, including
original intent (history), precedent, constitutional fact finding, constitutional scholarship, and
contemporary values”).
98. See Schauer, supra note 19, at 562 n.4.
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to it.99 More specifically, it does not involve balancing in the sense of
“the identification, valuation, and . . . head-to-head comparison”100 of
government regulatory and First Amendment interests.
Instead,
definitional balancing involves striking a balance between the competing
interests based on First Amendment values.101 The difference is between
balancing as a process and balancing as the result of a non-balancing
interpretive technique. This point is illustrated by the different senses in
which Dean Aleinikoff and Professor Nimmer use the term “balancing”
and its application in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.102
Dean Aleinikoff cites Sullivan as an example of a case that used “a
non-balancing approach.”103 He asserts that the Court “clearly” did not
engage in “balancing.”104 It “did not – as it has done in subsequent libel
cases – balance First Amendment interests against interests in preserving
reputation.”105 Instead, “[i]t settled on a ‘malice’ test . . . because it
deemed such protection of the press necessary to effectuate fully the
purposes of the Amendment.”106 Defamatory statements “based on
‘knowing falsehood’ and ‘reckless disregard’ are not protected by the
decision because they are not the types of speech that further First
Amendment goals.”107
It is true that the Court in Sullivan did not engage in balancing in
the sense that Dean Aleinikoff uses the term. It did not reach its decision
by a process of “identification, valuation, and comparison of competing
interests.”108 In other words, as Professor Nimmer said, the Court did not
engage in ad hoc balancing.109 However, the Court did engage in

99. See supra notes 20, 75, 77-98 and accompanying text.
100. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 945.
101. See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 950 (“[T]he threshold question must be whether . . . speech
values justify sweeping away [the government’s regulations].”). Cf. Stone, supra note 96, at 194
[T]he Court begins with the presumption that the first amendment protects all
communications and then creates areas of nonprotection only after it affirmatively finds
that a particular class of speech does not sufficiently further the underlying purposes of
the first amendment. . . . In attempting to strike the appropriate ‘balance’ . . . the Court
considers a number of factors, including relative value of the speech and the risk of
inadvertently chilling ‘high’ value expression.
Id. See infra notes 104-343 and accompanying text.
102. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying
text; see infra notes 103-119 and accompanying text.
103. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1001; N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
104. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1001.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 945.
109. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 943.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss2/5

16

Deutsch: "Definitional Balancing" and the First Amendment
DEUTSCH1.DOC

2006]

4/25/2006 6:12:38 PM

“DEFINITIONAL BALANCING” AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

499

balancing in the sense that Professor Nimmer used the term.
According to Professor Nimmer, the issue that the Court faced in
Sullivan was “which segment of defamatory speech lies outside the
umbrella of the First Amendment.”110 The answer to this question
inherently involves “competing policy considerations.”111 On the one
hand, there is “society’s interest in protecting reputations;”112 on the
other hand, there is the First Amendment interest in free expression.113 In
drawing the definitional line, the Court “implicitly” weighed the interest
and struck a balance between them.114 However, in striking the balance,
the Court’s focus was, as Professor Nimmer said it “must be,” on
“whether the speech values justified . . . sweeping away most of the law
of defamation where the statement is made against a public figure.”115
Professor Nimmer agreed with Dean Aleinikoff’s conclusion that
Sullivan was correctly decided because “speech values . . . are
inapplicable to speech which the speaker knows to be false.”116 In other
words, in drawing the definitional line the Court did not “balance” the
competing interests by a process of “identification, valuation, and
comparison of [the] competing interests,”117 nor did it define the
constitutional right based the government’s interest in regulation.118
Instead, it struck a definitional balance between the competing interests
based on its understanding of what the First Amendment requires. This
is precisely the kind of non-balancing interpretive technique that Dean
Aleinikoff and others argue is the appropriate way to interpret the
Constitution.119 Consequently, definitional balancing does not raise the

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 949.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 943, 948-51. Cf. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-2, at 792-93
Any exclusion of a class of activities from first amendment safeguards represents an
implicit conclusion that the government interests in regulating those activities are such as
to justify whatever limitation is thereby placed on the free expression of ideas. . . . The
question is whether the ‘balance’ should be struck for all cases in the process of framing
particular categorical definitions, or whether the ‘balance’ should be calibrated anew on
a case-by-case basis.
Id.
115. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 950.
116. Id. at 951; N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
117. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 945.
118. See Faigman, supra note 19, at 1524, 1555-62 (asserting that in practice the Court has
applied definitional balancing in a way that defines the scope of the First Amendment speech clause
based on the government’s regulatory interest and that to do so is “contrary to the fundamental
operating assumptions of the Constitution”). See also infra notes 271-93 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
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kind of issues that so concern the critics of conventional balancing.
B. How Has the Court Applied Definitional Balancing?
For the most part, in other instances where the Court has applied
definitional balancing as a technique for drawing definitional lines
within categories of speech, it has done so in the way it did in Sullivan.
It has recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, that competing speech
and governmental regulatory interests were at stake, but it has struck the
definitional balance between them based on its understanding of First
Amendment principles.120 Furthermore, contrary to the view of many
commentators,121 it has struck the balance in a way that has expanded the
scope of speech included within the First Amendment rather than
restricted it.
1. Fighting Words
Fighting words are one category of speech that is considered to be
outside the scope of the First Amendment. In Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, Chaplinsky was convicted of violating a state statute that
made it a crime to “address any offensive, derisive, or annoying word to
any other person who is lawfully in any . . . public place . . . [or to] call
him any offensive or derisive name. . . .”122 He had exclaimed to the
City Marshal: “‘You are a God damned racketeer’ and ‘a damned Fascist
and the whole government of Rochester are Fascist or agents of
Fascists.’”123 In upholding Chaplinsky’s conviction, the Court stated in
a well known dictum:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention, and punishment of which has never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problems. These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous and the insulting or ‘fighting words’
– those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
120. Cf. Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 3, at 1777 n.52 (“[In] obscenity, commercial
advertising, and defamation cases . . . the initial determination that speech was not covered by the
First Amendment was seemingly made solely on the basis of the absence of First Amendment value,
without regard to the strength of the state’s interest in regulation.”).
121. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
122. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).
123. Id.
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and morality.124

This dictum seems to have been the origin of the notion that definitional
balancing is a technique that limits the scope of the First Amendment
through a comparative balancing of competing speech and government
regulatory interests.125 However, the clear import of the dictum is that
fighting words are excluded from the First Amendment because they are
insufficiently related to the speech values of an “exposition of ideas” and
the search for “truth.”126 This is reinforced by the Court’s additional
observation that “[r]esort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any
proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by
the Constitution.”127 As the Court in a later case said, such words
“embod[y] a particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of
expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey.”128
For present purposes, it is irrelevant whether the Court was correct
in its interpretation of the First Amendment.129 The point is that the
Court excluded fighting words from the First Amendment not because
on “balance” they were outweighed by the “social interest in order and
morality,” but rather the Court excluded them from the First Amendment
because it thought that such speech lacked sufficient speech value.130
124. Id. at 571-72 (citing ZACHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149
(1941)). Shortly after Chaplinsky, the Court added commercial advertising to the categories of
speech that are excluded from the First Amendment. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942), overruled by Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
125. See sources cited supra notes 20, 75, 77.
126. See Donald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the First Amendment,
60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 629, 631 (1985) (in Chaplinsky, “[t]he Court excluded [fighting words]
from the Constitution’s protection because protecting it would be inconsistent with the values and
goals of the First Amendment”). Cf. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-8, at 837 (“The premise that speech
has special value only in the context of dialogue underlies the dictum of . . . Chaplinsky. . . .”).
127. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. See TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-8, at 839 (“The overriding
idea in Chaplinsky is . . . the isolation of those ‘utterances [that] are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas [and] of . . . slight social value as a step to truth.’”) (brackets and ellipsis in
original).
128. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992).
129. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 20, at 626 (“‘[F]ighting words’ represent a significant means
of self-realization, whether or not they can be considered a means of attaining some elusive
‘truth.’”); Emerson, supra note 17, at 443 (“The Chaplinsky dictum . . . is totally incompatible with
modern first amendment theory . . . [because] [i]t makes the exclusions turn on whether the
expression has ‘social value as a step to truth.’”).
130. But cf. Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 3, at 1777, 1777 n. 52.
To the Court, the fighting words Chaplinsky uttered were regulable not because the state
interest in controlling them was so powerful as to trump the First Amendment, but
because the words lay entirely outside the scope of the First Amendment.” However,
“Chaplinsky is not quite as clean a case on this score . . . because the Chaplinsky
language makes reference both to the degree of the injury and to the lack of First
Amendment value.
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On its face, the fighting words doctrine seems speech restrictive.
Chaplinsky’s rant certainly can be viewed as a “means of selfrealization”131 as well as legitimate government criticism.132 In any
event, by today’s standards his words seem mild, if not quaint.
However, since Chaplinsky, the Court has actually expanded the scope
of protection afforded to such speech, by “narrow[ing]” the definitional
line between fighting words that are excluded from the First Amendment
and speech that remains included.133
To constitute excluded fighting words, the words must do more
than merely “annoy or offend;”134 they must be “inherently
inflammatory.”135 They also must amount to “a direct personal insult”
that is “directed to the person of the hearer”136 and must “have a direct
tendency to cause acts of violence [by that person]”137 so as “to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.”138 The question is whether the words
are such as “to provoke the average person to retaliation.”139
Furthermore, statutes that purport to punish such speech must be
narrowly drawn.140 Under these standards, the Court has refused to
sustain any fighting words convictions in post Chaplinsky cases, many
of which involved speech more provocative than Chaplinsky’s.141
Perhaps the most significant narrowing of the definitional line
occurred in R.A.V. v. St.Paul.142 In that case a teenager, along with
others, burned a cross on the property of a black family.143 He was
prosecuted under an ordinance that provided “‘[w]hoever places on . . .
Id.
131. Redish, supra note 20, at 626.
132. See Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words As Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 542
(1980).
133. See TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-10 at 850 (“More recent Supreme Court decisions . . .
made clear that the ‘fighting words’ exception . . . must be narrowly construed.”); id. at 850-51
nn.5-6 (collecting cases).
134. See Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 465 (1987).
135. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969).
136. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (quoting in part Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 309 (1940)).
137. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972).
138. Id. at 525 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
139. Street, 394 U.S. at 592 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574).
140. See, e.g., Gooding, 405 U.S. at 519 (discussing overbreath).
141. See, e.g., id. at 519 n.1 (addressed to police officers: “‘White son of a bitch, I’ll kill you.’”
“‘You son of a bitch, I’ll choke you to death.’” “‘You son of a bitch, if you ever put your hands on
me again, I’ll cut you all to pieces.’”) (statute held overbroad); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107
(1973) (words not addressed to any particular person included “‘We’ll take the fucking streets later’
or ‘We’ll take the fucking streets again’”).
142. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
143. Id. at 379.
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private property . . . a burning cross . . . which one knows or has reason
to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion, or gender commits disorderly conduct and
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”144 The majority held that statute was
was unconstitutional on its face, even if it applied only to proscribable
fighting words, because it was content based.145
In reaching its conclusion, the majority created a definitional rule
based on an interpretation of the First Amendment. They held that
categories of speech that are otherwise excluded from First Amendment
protection are not “entirely invisible to the Constitution.”146 First
Amendment values prohibit government regulation of speech simply
because the government does not like the content of a speaker’s
message, and this limitation applies even to otherwise unprotected
speech.147 In other words, “the First Amendment imposes . . . a ‘content
discrimination limitation’ upon a State’s prohibition of proscribable
speech.”148
Thus, government may only proscribe such speech if does so for the
reasons that such speech is excluded from the First Amendment; it may
not proscribe such speech because it does not like the content of the
message expressed.149 The ordinance at issue was unconstitutional
because the city did not proscribe fighting words for the reasons why
such words are outside the scope of the First Amendment. Instead,
“it . . . proscribed fighting words of whatever manner that communicate
messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance,” i.e. it only
proscribed fighting words that expressed a message it did not like.150
144. Id. at 380.
145. Id. at 381. Four Justices concurred in the result, but rejected the majority’s analysis. Id. at
397 (White, J., concurring); Id. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Id. at 416 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
146. Id. at 383 (majority).
147. See id. at 383-84.
148. Id. at 387. The majority reasoned as follows:
[T]he exclusion of ‘fighting words’ from the scope of the First Amendment simply
means that, for purposes of that Amendment, the unprotected features of the words are,
despite their verbal character, essentially a ‘nonspeech’ element of communication.
Fighting words are thus analogous to a noisy sound truck: Each is . . . a ‘mode of
speech’ . . . ; both can be used to convey an idea; but neither has, in and of itself, a claim
on the First Amendment. As with the sound truck, however, so also with fighting words:
The government may not regulate use based on hostility – or favoritism – towards the
underlying message expressed.
Id. at 386.
149. See id. at 382-90.
150. Id. at 393-94. The city “assert[ed] that a general ‘fighting words’ law would not meet the
city’s needs because only a content-specific measure can communicate to minority groups that the
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This, the majority held, the city could not do under the First
Amendment.151
Although R.A.V. arose in the context of fighting words, the rule
applies to all categories of speech that are otherwise deemed not speech
in the constitutional sense. Thus, such speech is not included within the
First Amendment only to the extent of the underlying reasons why such
speech is excluded.152 This seems a very speech protective way of
drawing the definitional line between speech that is encompassed within
the First Amendment and speech that is not.
2. Speech That Provokes a Hostile Audience
Speech that provokes a hostile audience is another category of
speech that is not included within the First Amendment. However, the
Court has drawn the definitional line between such speech that is
excluded, and speech that is included, based on speech values and in a
speech protective way. The Court has said that government may
proscribe speech that provokes a hostile audience where there exists a
“clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon
the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or
order.”153 Thus, speech is unprotected where “the speaker passes the
bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot.”154
On the other hand, speech that “stir[s] people to anger, invite[s] public
dispute, or [brings] about a condition of unrest”155 is protected since “a
function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute.”156 In such cases “the ordinary murmurings and objections of a
hostile audience cannot be allowed to silence a speaker.”157
‘group hatred’ aspect of such speech ‘is not condoned by the majority.’” Id. at 392.
151. See id. at 391-94.
152. This slightly modifies the assertion made supra text accompanying note 5.
153. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
154. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951).
155. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 238 (1963) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 5 (1949)).
156. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4.
157. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 320. Applying the standards set out in the text, the Court has reversed
convictions in the following situations: (1) where the speaker “aroused animosity” but there was
“no . . . clear and present menace to public peace and order,” Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311; (2) the
speaker was convicted for inviting a “dispute,” Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 3; (3) “there was no
violence or threat of violence [by demonstrators] or . . . the crowd watching them [and] police
protection was ‘ample,’ Edwards, 372 U.S. at 236; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 550-51 (1965)
(same); and (4) where “onlookers became unruly” but there was “no evidence [available] that
petitioner’s conduct was disorderly.” Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111, 112 (1969).
However, in Feiner, the Court thought that “the speaker [had] passe[ed] the bounds of argument or
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3. Advocacy of Illegal Action
The Court has also drawn, in a speech protective way, based on
speech values, the definitional line between advocacy of illegal action
that is included, and such speech that is excluded, from the First
Amendment. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court created the definitional
rule that “the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.”158 However, the Court did not expressly explain why it
drew the line at this point, but it did indicate that the rule had its roots in
prior decisions.159 Those cases indicate that the Brandenburg rule is
based on the speech values at stake as articulated in the classic opinions
of Judge Hand and Justices Holmes and Brandeis160
The prevailing view in the pre-Brandenburg cases was that, in
proscribing advocacy of illegal action, “it was not essential that . . .
immediate execution should be advocated”161 and that “success or
probability of success [was not] the criterion.”162 This position was
often based on the government’s interest in self preservation.163 On the
other hand, Judge Hand argued that only “direct advocacy” of illegal
action could be proscribed.164 He thought that a lesser standard would
have “as a consequence the suppression of all hostile criticism, and of all

persuasion and undert[ook] incitement to riot” and that “disorder” was “imminen[t].” Feiner, 340
U.S. at 321.
158. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
159. Id.
160. See TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-10, at 848 (Brandenburg is a “synthesis, combining the
best of Hand’s views with the best of Holmes’ and Brandeis’”).
161. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 671-72 (1925).
162. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509-10 (1951).
163. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 669. Thus, it was argued that:
[U]tterances inciting to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means,
present a sufficient danger of substantive evil to bring their punishment within the range
of legislative discretion . . . . Such utterances, by their very nature, involve danger to the
public peace and to the security of the State. They threaten breaches of the peace and
ultimate revolution. And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial
because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. . . . It cannot
reasonably be required to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace and safety
until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or
imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its
judgment, suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency.
Id.
164. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d 264 F. 24 (2d Cir
1917).
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opinion except what encouraged and supported the existing policies, or
which fell within the range of temperate argument.”165
In addition to Judge Hand, Justices Holmes and Brandeis thought
that “[e]very idea is an incitement.”166 The drafters of the Constitution
were themselves revolutionaries.167 They “were not cowards.”168 “They
did not fear political change [and] [t]hey did not exalt order at the cost of
liberty.”169 Instead:
They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. . . . They believed
that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with
them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom
is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that
this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.
But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of
punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage
thought, hope, and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the
path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil
counsels is good ones. . . . Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of
governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free
speech and assembly should be guaranteed.170

Consequently, “[f]ear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly.”171 “Only an emergency can
justify repression.”172 “The fact that speech is likely to result in some
violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its
suppression.”173 “Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be
applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of
law, not abridgement of the rights of free speech and assembly.”174 Thus,
165. Id. at 539-40.
166. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting).
167. See, Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J.,
concurring), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 375-76.
171. Id. at 376.
172. Id. at 377. See also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting).
173. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 378 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
174. Id.
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in the Holmes and Brandeis view:
To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground
to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is
imminent. There must be reasonable grounds to believe that the evil to
be prevented is a serious one.175

Obviously the Court in Brandenburg concluded that the speech
values at stake, that Hand and Holmes and Brandeis articulated, required
that advocacy of illegal action be proscribed only where there is
advocacy of immediate action, and there is a likelihood of success.
Consequently, under Brandenburg’s definitional rule, speech that
advocates overthrowing lawful government, or other illegal action, is
speech within the meaning of First Amendment, provided that “such
advocacy is [not] directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action [or] is [not] likely to incite or produce such action.”176 Again, this
seems a very speech protective way of drawing the definitional line
between advocacy of illegal action that is encompassed within the First
Amendment and such speech that is not.
4. Threatening Speech
Threatening speech is another category of speech that is not
considered speech in the constitutional sense. Here, too, the Court has
drawn, in a speech protective fashion, based on speech values, the
definitional line between threats that are proscribable based on their
content, and speech that remains included within the First Amendment.
The Court has recognized that government has a strong interest in
protecting its citizens from threats.177 However, it has also recognized
that the definition of constitutionally proscribable threats must be made
in light of the speech values at stake.178 These values include “‘a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks.’”179
Consequently, the Court has held that it is only “true ‘threat[s]’”

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
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that are outside the scope of the First Amendment.180 Such threats
“encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate
a serious expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to
an individual or a group of individuals.”181 Furthermore, “[t]he speaker
need not actually intend to carry out the threat.”182 Instead, “a
prohibition against true threats ‘protect[s] individuals from the fear of
violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders’ in addition to
protecting people ‘from the possibility that the threatened violence will
occur.’”183 Thus, “intimidation . . . where a speaker directs a threat to a
person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of
bodily harm or death”184 is also a true threat.
On the other hand, speech that amounts to “political hyperbole,”185
“creat[es] anger or resentment,”186 or is “insulting, or even
outrageous,”187 or that is “menacing”188 may not, in and of themselves,
amount to constitutionally proscribable true threats. For example,
burning a cross at a Ku Klux Klan rally may be treated as “core political
speech” within the scope of the First Amendment,189 even though it has
been argued that “[i]n our culture, cross burning has almost invariably
meant lawlessness and understandably instills in its victims wellgrounded fear of physical violence.”190 The fact that such a cross
burning “arouses a sense of anger or hatred” is not enough to make it a

180. Id.
181. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
182. Id. 359-60.
183. Id. at 360 (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
184. Id.
185. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 706, 707-08 (1969) (A potential draftee stated that if
he was drafted and given a gun “the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J”).
186. Black, 538 U.S. at 366 (cross burning).
187. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994) (abortion protesters
approaching patients at an abortion clinic).
188. Rothchild, supra note 9, at 223. Rothchild makes the point that certain speech that he
calls “menacing,” such as that involved in the Nuremberg Files case may not amount to true threats.
Id. In that case, anti-abortion activists, among other things, created and posted on the internet a
poster that listed the names, addresses, and phone numbers of abortion providers, exclaimed that
abortion is like a “war crime,” proclaimed that the providers were “GUILTY of crimes against
humanity,” and “offer[ed] a ‘$ 5,000 reward’ for ‘information leading to the arrest, conviction and
revocation of license to practice medicine.’” Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life
Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1186 (D. Or. 1998). Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals sitting en banc held 6-5 that the Nuremberg Files amounted to a proscribable threat.
Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. den.
539 U.S. 958 (2003).
189. Black, 538 U.S. at 365.
190. Id. at 391 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
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true threat.191
5. Offensive Speech
Offensive, non-erotic speech is another category of speech where
the Court has created a definitional rule, based on speech values, that has
expanded the scope of speech included within the First Amendment. In
Cohen v. California,192 Cohen wore a jacket in the hallway outside a
courtroom in a county courthouse that bore the term “Fuck the Draft.”193
He was convicted of violating a statute that “prohibit[ed] ‘maliciously
and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or
person . . . by offensive conduct.’”194
In Chaplinsky, the Court mentioned profane speech as a category of
speech that was not included within the First Amendment; it said that the
relationship between such speech and the First Amendment values of the
“exposition of ideas” and search for “truth” was “slight.”195 However,
the Court in Cohen engaged in a more detailed analysis of whether
speech that some might find offensive, which presumably would include
profanity,196 is consistent with First Amendment values.
The Court recognized that government might have some interest in
“maintain[ing] . . . a suitable level of discourse within the body
politic.”197 However, it held that speech values required that offensive
speech be included within the First Amendment. The Court noted that,
as a general “rule . . . governmental bodies may not proscribe the form
or content of individual expression.”198 The reason for this rule is that:
[T]he constitutional right of free expression] is designed and intended
to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion,
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the
hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will
ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity
and in the belief that no approach would comport with the premise of

191. See id. at 366.
192. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
193. Id. at 16.
194. Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1971)) (ellipsis in original).
195. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). See supra text
accompanying note 124.
196. See Shaman, Low Value Speech, supra note 9, at 312-13 (equating profanity with
offensive speech).
197. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 23.
198. Id. at 24.
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individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.199

Furthermore, although “[t]o many, the immediate consequence of
this freedom may often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and
even offensive utterance[,] [t]hese are . . . in truth necessary side effects
of the broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits
us to achieve.”200 Consequently, “so long as the means are peaceful, the
communication need not meet standards of acceptability.”201
More specifically, the Court held that there was “no readily
ascertainable general principle”202 for determining what speech is
offensive. “[O]ne can[not] forbid particular words without also running a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas,” and the Constitution is
“solicitous” of both the “cognitive content” and “emotive function” of
words.203 Thus, as a result of the definitional balance struck in Cohen,
offensive speech is deemed to be speech in the constitutional sense.204
6. Commercial Speech
Commercial speech is another category where the Court has created
a definitional rule, based on speech values, that has expanded the scope
of speech that is deemed speech within the meaning of the Constitution.
Initially, the Court assumed that commercial speech was a category of
speech that was entirely excluded from the First Amendment.205
199. Id. (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) overruled in part by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
200. Id. at 24-25.
201. Id. at 25.
202. Id.
203. Id (quoting Org. for Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
204. Government’s attempts to regulate constitutionally protected offensive speech has had
mixed results. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (affirming the granting of a preliminary
injunction enjoining the enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act, 112 Stat. 2681-736);
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (upholding section 10 (a),
and striking down sections 10 (b) and (c) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. §§ 532 (h), (j), 531 (1988)); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726 (1978) (upholding the FCC’s authority to regulate indecent and profane radio broadcasts); Reno
v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding unconstitutional the Communications Decency Act of
1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. II 1994)); Sable Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)
(holding that the amendment to the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1998), was
unconstitutional to the extent that it prohibits dial-a-porn telephone messages that are indecent, but
not obscene); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc, 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (upholding the
District Court’s conclusion that section 5 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 561
(2000), violated the First Amendment).
205. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942), overruled by Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (“[T]he constitution imposes no . . . restraint[s] on government as
respects purely commercial advertising.”).
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However, in Virginia State Board Of Pharmacy v. Citizens Consumer
Council206 the Court recognized the “substantial” speech values inherent
in commercial speech.207
The case involved a challenge to a state law that prohibited licensed
pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices. In considering
the speech values involved in such advertisements, the Court concluded
that “speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial
transaction’ . . . is [not] so removed from any ‘exposition of ideas,’ and
from ‘truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of
liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,’ that it lacks all
protection.”208 It reasoned that individuals and society in general had a
“strong interest in the free flow of [such] commercial information.”209
Buyers have an interest in “where their scarce dollars are best spent.”210
In addition, society has an interest in “intelligent and well informed”
decision making with respect to the buying and selling of goods.211 In
this regard, “the free flow of commercial information is indispensable . .
. to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system.”212
Such information “is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent
opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered.”213 The
Court concluded that “even if the First Amendment were to be thought
to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decision-making in a
democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does not
serve that goal.”214
The Court recognized the State’s rationale for prohibiting such
advertisements.215 The State argued that such a ban was necessary to
preserve “a high degree of professionalism on the part of licensed
pharmacists.”216
It maintained that advertising would result in
“aggressive price competition”217 that would put the “painstaking and
206. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
207. Id. 762-66; cf. Eberle, supra note 73, at 453 (noting that in Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy “[t]he Court employed a web of interdependent values . . . [including] [t]ruth, selfrealization, and autonomy . . . which support and are supported by democracy, self-government,
dignity, equality and liberty”).
208. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (internal citations omitted).
209. See id. at 763-65.
210. Id. at 763.
211. Id. at 765.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 766-70.
216. Id. at 766.
217. Id. at 767.
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conscientious pharmacist . . . out of business,” increase drug costs,
destroy the “stable pharmacist-customer relationship” which would
make it “impossible” to monitor patients drugs, and “reduce the
pharmacist’s status to that of a mere retailer.”218 However, the Court
noted that there was “an alternative to this highly paternalistic
approach.”219 A better way to look at the problem was “to assume that
this information is not itself harmful, that people will perceive their own
best interest if only they are well enough informed, and that the best
means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than
to close them.”220 Nonetheless, it held that “the choice among these
alternative approaches is not ours to make or [the state’s;] [i]t is
precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing
information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that
the First Amendment makes for us.”221
The Court drew the definitional line at truthful, non-deceptive
commercial speech about a lawful product, as compared to all
commercial speech.222 In doing so, the Court noted the differences
between commercial speech and political speech. It pointed out that the
former is “more easily verifiable by its disseminator . . . [who]
presumably knows more about [it] than anyone else” and that because of
the profit motive, it is also “more durable” and thus “there is little
likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and foregone
entirely.”223 Consequently, “the greater objectivity and hardiness of
commercial speech may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate
statements for fear of silencing the speaker,” and it “may also make it
appropriate to require that a commercial message appear in such a form,
or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are
necessary to prevent its being deceptive.”224 Whether or not the Court
drew the definitional line in the appropriate place,225 there can be no
218. Id. at 768.
219. Id. at 770.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See id. at 773.
223. Id. at 772 n.24.
224. Id.
225. Commentators are divided on whether and to what extent commercial speech should be
deemed speech in the constitutional sense. For example, compare Emerson, supra note 17, at 460
(“It is by no means self-evident that commercial speech will fit into the system at all. Commercial
speech does not promote the underlying values of the system in the same manner as does other
expression.”) with Redish, supra note 20, at 635 (“Even though . . . analysis may justify many forms
of regulation of false and misleading advertising, it does not support attempts to draw additional
distinctions between commercial and other forms of expression.”).
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doubt that in holding that truthful, non-deceptive commercial speech
about a lawful product was speech in the constitutional sense, the Court
expanded the scope of speech included within the First Amendment, and
that it did so based on speech values rather than on a comparative
balancing of interest.226
7. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Court has also created a definitional rule, based on speech
values, that has expanded the scope of speech encompassed within the
First Amendment with respect to the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 227 the Court
recognized that the government has an important interest in
compensating the victims of the tort. “Generally speaking the law does
not regard the intent to inflict emotional distress as one which should
receive much solicitude, and it is quite understandable that most if not
all jurisdictions have chosen to make it civilly culpable where the
conduct in question is sufficiently ‘outrageous.’”228
However, the Court drew the definitional line based on the
important speech values at stake even with speech that meets the
elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The sort of robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment
is bound to produce speech that is critical of those who hold public
office or those public figures who are ‘intimately involved in the
resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame,
shape events in areas of concern to society at large.’229

In such debates “many things [are] done with motives that are less than
admirable.”230 Nonetheless, the First Amendment protects speech “even
when a speaker or writer is motivated by hatred or ill-will.”231
The reason for this protection is to encourage public debate on
public issues.232 Such debate “‘will not be uninhibited if the speaker
must run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of
226. The current standards for government regulation of constitutionally protected truthful,
non-deceptive commercial speech about a lawful product are set out in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
227. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
228. Id. at 53.
229. Id. at 51 (quoting Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring)).
230. Id. at 53.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed
contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of
truth.’”233 Consequently, the Court held that “public figures and public
officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress . . . without showing . . . that the publication contains
a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice.’”234 Such
a rule is “necessary to give adequate ‘breathing space’ to the freedoms
protected by the First Amendment.”235
8. Invasion of Privacy
a. False Light Privacy
The Court has also applied definitional balancing in a speech
protective way, based on speech values, to expand the scope of
constitutionally protected speech with respect to the tort of invasion of
privacy by placing the plaintiff in a false light. Government has an
obvious interest in protecting is citizens “from society’s searching
eye.”236 However, in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court held that the speech
values at stake required a definitional rule that such speech is included
within the scope of the First Amendment with respect to matters of
public concern unless published with actual malice.237
The Court reasoned that the First Amendment “guarantees for
speech and press are not the preserve of political expression,” but instead
also generally apply to matters of public concern.238 Just as in the
former, false statements are “inevitable” in the latter.239 Consequently,
freedom of speech needs “‘breathing space’ . . . ‘to survive.’”240
Otherwise speakers might be deterred from commenting on matters of
public concern because of fear of law suits. 241
In addition, the Court thought that it would “create a grave risk of
serious impairment of the indispensable service of a free press . . . [to]
saddle the press with the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty
the facts associated in news articles with a person’s name, picture or
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964).
Id. at 56.
Id.
Nimmer, supra note 9, at 958.
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1966).
Id. at 388.
Id.
Id. (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255, 271-72 (1964)).
See id. at 389.
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portrait, particularly as related to a nondefamatory matter.”242 Even “[a]
negligence test would place on the press the intolerable burden of
guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it
to verify the accuracy of every reference to a name, picture or
portrait.”243
b. Disclosure of Private Facts
Applying definitional balancing, the Court again expanded the
scope of speech encompassed within the First Amendment, based on
First Amendment values, with respect to the privacy tort of disclosing
private facts. In Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, a reporter, in violation of a
state statute, broadcasted the name of a rape victim that he had obtained
from public records.244 The Court recognized that government has an
interest in restricting such speech. It said that “there is a zone of privacy
surrounding every individual, a zone within which the State may protect
him from intrusion by the press, with all its attendant publicity.”245 It
also noted that a person’s “right to be free from unwanted publicity
about his private affairs, which, although wholly true, would be
offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities”246 is “plainly rooted in the
traditions and significant concerns of our society.”247
Nonetheless, it drew the definitional line based on First
Amendment values. It noted the interest of a “free press . . . [was also]
plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our
society.”248 Furthermore:
The publication of truthful information available on the public record
contains none of the indicia of those limited categories of expression,
such as ‘fighting’ words, which ‘are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.’249

To the contrary, the Court reasoned that:

242. Id.
243. Id. However, Professor Nimmer thought that the Court protected too much speech in Hill.
See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 956-67. See also infra Part III.C.
244. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471-73 (1975).
245. Id. at 487.
246. Id. at 489.
247. Id. at 491.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 495 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
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[I]n a society in which each individual has but limited time and
resources with which to observe at first hand the operations of his
government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in
convenient form the facts of those operations. Great responsibility is
accordingly placed upon the news media to report fully and accurately
the proceedings of government, and official records and documents
open to the public are the basic data of governmental operations.
Without the information provided by the press most of us and many of
our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register
opinions on the administration of government generally. 250

In addition, the Court was “reluctant to embark on a course that
would make public records generally available to the media but forbid
their publication if offensive to the sensibilities of the supposed
reasonable man.”251 “Such a rule would make it very difficult for the
media to inform citizens about the public business and yet stay within
the law . . . [and] would invite timidity and self-censorship and very
likely lead to the suppression of many items that would otherwise be
published and that should be made available to the public.”252
Consequently, the Court created the definitional rule that “the state
may [not] impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a
rape victim obtained from public records – more specifically, from
judicial records which are maintained in connection with a public
prosecution and which themselves are open to public inspection.”253 In
subsequent cases, the Court has broadened the definitional rule so that
“if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of
the highest order.”254 Clearly, a rule that defines First Amendment
speech to include the invasion of personal privacy, by publishing the
name of rape victims, must be viewed as being quite speech protective.
c. Appropriation of Private Property
Appropriation of private property is one of the few instances in
which the Court has struck the definitional balance in a way that has
250. Id. at 491-92.
251. Id. at 496.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 491.
254. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (juvenile offender). See also
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001) (intercepted cellular phone conversation); Florida
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (rape victim).
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narrowed the scope of speech included within the First Amendment.
Here too, however, the Court based its decision on an interpretation of
the First Amendment, rather than by a comparative balancing of
interests. Thus, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, a
broadcast station, as part of a newscast, televised a performer’s an entire
fifteen second act of him being shot out of a cannon.255 The Court held
that under the circumstances the “First and Fourteen Amendments do not
immunize the media when they broadcast a performer’s entire act
without his consent.”256
In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized that there were
competing interests involved. It noted that the press needs “‘breathing
room;’”257 that “entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment
protection, and entertainment itself can be important news.”258 On the
other hand, it recognized that “[t]he broadcast of a film of [the
entertainer’s] entire act poses a substantial threat to the economic value
of that performance . . . [,which] is the product of [his] own talents and
energy, the end result of much time, effort, and expense.”259 “[U]njust
enrichment” would result if others could broadcast the entertainer’s act
without paying for it.260 The Court could see “[n]o social purpose . . .
served by” such an occurrence.261 Furthermore, “protecting the
proprietary interest of the individual in his act262 . . . provides an
economic incentive for him to make the investment required to produce
a performance of interest to the public.”263 This is in contrast to false
light privacy, the invasion of which is constitutionally protected in the
absence of actual malice, where what is at stake is “reputation, with the
same overtones of mental distress.”264
In the end, however, the Court based its decision on an
interpretation of the First Amendment.265 It held that:
The Constitution no more prevents a state from requiring [the press] to
compensate [an entertainer] for broadcasting his act on television than

255. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563-64 (1977).
256. Id. at 575.
257. Id. at 570 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 461 (1976)).
258. Id. at 578.
259. Id. at 575.
260. Id. at 576.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 573.
263. Id. at 576.
264. Id. at 573.
265. Cf. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-14, at 888 (“[I]nterests in property and livelihood continue
to rest on a powerful constitutional base . . . .”).
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it would privilege [the press] to film and broadcast a copyrighted
dramatic work without liability to the copyright owner, or to film and
broadcast a prize fight, or a baseball game, where the promoters or the
participants had other plans for publicizing the event.266

Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the fact that the First Amendment
excludes the television station’s broadcast, even as part of a newscast,
would not deprive the public of an opportunity to view the
entertainment;267 “the only question is who gets to do the publishing.”268
This is in contrast to false light privacy where “the only way to protect
the interest involved is to attempt to minimize publication of the
damaging matter.”269
9. Obscene Speech
The Court has also applied definitional balancing in obscenity
cases. Chaplinsky specifically mentioned obscene speech as one of the
categories of speech that is excluded from the First Amendment.270
Nonetheless, the Court has drawn the definitional line with respect to
obscenity in a way that actually expands the scope of constitutional
protection given to sexually explicit speech. In addition, while the Court
has recognized that competing interests are at stake, it has struck the
definitional balance between them based on its understanding of First
Amendment values.
However, Professor Faigman maintains that the Court excluded
obscenity from the First Amendment based on the government’s
regulatory interest rather than on its lack of speech value.271 He relies on
Roth v. United States 272 and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 273 to
support his position. He asserts that in Roth, the Court engaged in
“‘balancing’” and that it “advanced the ‘social interest in order and
morality’ to define speech.”274 He bases his argument primarily on the
266. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575 (internal citations omitted). For a copyright case see Harper &
Roe Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (“[W]e see no warrant for
expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure exception to
copyright.”).
267. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578.
268. Id. at 573.
269. Id.
270. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
271. See David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication,
88 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 677-81 (1994); Faigman, supra note 19, at 1555-62.
272. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
273. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
274. Faigman, supra note 19, at 1558-59 (emphasis added).
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fact that the Court in Roth quoted the Chaplinsky dictum that “obscene
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.”275 The problem with this analysis is that, as noted earlier,
the essence of the Chaplinsky dictum is that obscenity is not speech
within the meaning of the First Amendment, not as the result of a
comparative balancing of interests, but because obscene speech is
inconsistent with the speech values of “an exposition of ideas” and the
search for “truth.”276
Furthermore, the proposition that the Court in Roth defined
obscenity as outside the scope of constitutionally included speech based
on an analysis of the First Amendment, rather than on a comparative
balancing of the government’s regulatory interests and speech values, is
reinforced by the Court’s reasoning:
The guaranties of freedom of expression in effect in 10 of the 14 states
which by 1792 had ratified the Constitution, gave no absolute
protection for every utterance. Thirteen of the 14 States provided for
the prosecution of libel, and all of those States made either blasphemy
or profanity, or both, statutory crimes. . . . In light of this history, it is
apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was
not intended to protect every utterance. . . . The protection given
speech and the press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people. . . . All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social
importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful
to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the
guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited
area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming
social importance. This rejection for that reason is mirrored in the
universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained, reflected in the
international agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of all
of the 48 States, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by the
Congress. . . .277

Professor Faigman recognizes that this reasoning is consistent “with
traditional principles” and is “based . . . on the content of the First
275. Id. at 1558 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942))).
276. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
277. Roth, 354 U.S. at 482-85.
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Amendment,” but dismisses it on the ground that it “suffers many
weaknesses.” 278 However, for present purposes it is irrelevant whether
the Court’s reasoning was strong or weak. The point is that the Court
based its decision on its view of “the content of the First Amendment,”
and not on an assessment of the government’s regulatory interest.
Any doubt that obscenity is excluded from the First Amendment
because of its lack of First Amendment value and not because of the
government’s interest in regulation, was seemingly dispelled in Miller v.
California,279 a case that Professor Faigman does not discuss. In that
case, the Court observed that the “First Amendment protects works
which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value, regardless of whether the government or a majority of
the people approve of [them].” It was designed “to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.”280 It was not designed to protect “the
public portrayal of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the
ensuing commercial gain.”281 The Court thought that “to equate the free
and robust exchange of ideas and political debate with the commercial
exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand conception of the
First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for
freedom.”282
Despite Miller, Professor Faigman argues that in Paris Adult
Theatre I, which was a companion case to Miller, “it [was] the
government interests themselves that led the Court to define speech so as
not to encompass obscenity.”283 Other commentators also have viewed
Paris Adult Theatre I as a case in which the Court excluded obscenity
from the First Amendment based on the government’s regulatory
interests.284 However, the Court in Paris Adult Theatre I did not define
278. Faigman, supra note 19, at 1557-58. His argument is that “[i]f [the Court’s] . . . historical
argument . . . alone supported the exclusion of obscenity from First Amendment protection,
profanity and blasphemy too should be excluded. But the Court has not, and is not likely to, read
this history so conclusively.” Id. at 1558.
279. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
280. Id. at 34-35 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 484).
281. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
282. Id. at 34.
283. Faigman, supra note 271, at 678. See also id, at 678 n.156; Faigman supra note 19, at
1560-62.
284. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 22 (“Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton asserts that the
distribution of obscene material is not protected under the first amendment because it debases
human personality; it violates social interest in morality; it interferes with the state’s right to
maintain a decent society.”) (emphasis removed); TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-16 at 916-17 (similar);
Redish, supra note 20, at 637-39 (similar).
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obscenity as outside the scope of the First Amendment. The Court had
already reached that conclusion in Miller on the ground that it lacks First
Amendment value.285 In fact, Paris Adult Theatre I was not a First
Amendment case at all.
Just because speech is excluded from the First Amendment does not
mean that it is devoid of all constitutional protection. Like all
legislation, regulations of speech that are excluded from the First
Amendment must still pass “minimal due process” review.286 Thus,
since Miller had reaffirmed that obscenity is excluded from the First
Amendment, the government regulations in Paris Adult Theatre I did not
have to meet First Amendment standards, they only had to meet rational
basis review. Consequently, the issue in Paris Adult Theatre I was
whether the government had “a legitimate interest” in regulating
obscenity with respect to consenting adults.287 The Court held that the
government did have legitimate interests in regulating such speech.
“These include the interest of the public in the quality of life and the
total community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city
centers, and possibly, the public safety itself.”288 This was so even if
“there [was] no scientific data which conclusively demonstrate that
exposure to obscene material adversely affects men and women or their
society.”289 The reason was that “[i]t [was] not for the Court to resolve
empirical uncertainties underlying state legislation, save in the
exceptional case where that legislation plainly impinges upon rights
protected by the Constitution.”290 In other words, since Miller
reaffirmed that obscenity is not a First Amendment speech “right,” the
Court in Paris Adult Theatre I could, and did, simply defer to the
government’s judgment of obscenity’s harms for purposes of rational
basis review. Therefore, since Paris Adult Theatre I was not a First
Amendment case, it does not undermine the proposition that the Court
defined obscenity outside the scope of the First Amendment, as stated in
Miller, because of obscenity’s lack of First Amendment value, rather
than on the basis of a comparative analysis of the government’s
285. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973). In Paris Adult Theatre I, the
Court cited Miller for the proposition that “[w]e have today reaffirmed the basic holding of [Roth]
that obscene material has no protection under the First Amendment.” Id.
286. See TRIBE, supra note 16, §§12.2 at 792, 12.8 at 832. See also id. § 12.2 at 836 (noting
that regulations of speech excluded from the First Amendment are “subject only to the barest due
process scrutiny”).
287. See Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 69.
288. Id. at 58.
289. Id. at 60.
290. Id.
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regulatory interests.
Furthermore, not only did the Court strike the definitional balance
based on First Amendment values, but it also drew the definitional line
in a way that gives considerable protection to sexually explicit speech.
The Court recognized “the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate
any form of expression.”291 Therefore, the Court drew the definitional
line narrowly so as to “confine the permissible scope of . . .
regulation.”292 Thus, under the so-called Miller test, obscenity is defined
as sexually explicit material that
‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’
would find . . . , taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and . . . taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.293

Consequently, under the definitional line drawn in Miller, the
commercial exploitation of “[p]atently offensive representations or
descriptions of ultimate sex acts, . . . masturbation, excretory functions,
and lewd exhibitions of the genitals” are all deemed to be speech within
the meaning of the First Amendment – provided only that the “work,
taken as a whole, [does not] lack[] serious literary, artistic, or scientific
value.”294 This seems very speech protective.295
10. Child Pornography
In New York v. Ferber, 296 the Court applied definitional balancing
in a speech protective manner, to create a definitional rule with respect
to child pornography. However, whether the Court based its decision on
a consideration of First Amendment values, rather than on a comparative
balancing of competing interests, is somewhat problematical. Some
commentators have taken the latter position.297
291. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
292. Id. at 24.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 24-25.
295. Government may still regulate constitutionally protected adult entertainment but the
regulations must meet First Amendment standards. See Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000)
(regulation of the secondary effects of nude dancing); Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535
U.S. 425 (2002) (regulation of the secondary effects of adult bookstores and video arcades).
296. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
297. See Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 946 (Ferber is an example of a case where “the Court
places the interest on a set of scales and rules the way the scales tip”); Faigman, supra note 19, at
1537 (Court balanced the value of child pornography against harm to children). Cf. TRIBE, supra
note 16, at § 12-18, at 939 (In Ferber “[t]he Court engaged in generalized balancing to assess the
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In Ferber, the Court did say, with respect to child pornography, that
“the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive
interest, if any, at stake.”298 It also observed that child pornography
causes harm to children and that government’s interest in protecting
children was one “of surpassing importance” and “compelling.”299 The
reason is that the use of real children in pornography implicates the
“sexual exploitation and abuse of children”300 that is “harmful to the
physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child.”301 Such
“materials . . . are a permanent record of the children’s participation and
the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation.”302 Furthermore,
from the abused child’s perspective, it does not matter “whether or not
the material . . . has . . . literary, artistic, political, or social value,”303 or
otherwise does, or does not, meet the definition of obscenity.304
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it does not necessarily follow that
the Court upheld the statute in Ferber because the evil of child
pornography outweighed its expressive value. This statement seems to
have been merely part of the Court’s observation that the “balance of
competing interests” had been “struck” in favor of regulation.305
Instead, at least arguably, the Court seems to have based its decision on
the lack of First Amendment value of such speech. It specifically held
that the First Amendment does not include the visual depictions of child
pornography that can cause harm to real children because “[t]he value of
permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of children
engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de
minimis.” 306 Thus, the mere fact that the Court recognized that the
government wanted to regulate such speech for the same reason that the
First Amendment excludes it (i.e., it causes real harm to real children)
does not mean the Court based its decision on a balancing of interests
rather than on the fact that such speech is not the kind of speech that the
constitutional value of the entire category of speech, rather than weighing the merits of the
particular restriction on expression in an ad hoc way”).
298. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64.
299. Id. at 756-57.
300. Id. at 757.
301. Id. at 758.
302. Id. at 759.
303. Id. at 761 (quoting Memorandum of Assemblyman Lasher in Support of N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 263.15 (McKinney 1980)).
304. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.(second set of ellipsis in original).
305. See id. at 764.
306. Id. at 762. The Court noted that if “visual depictions of children performing sexual acts or
lewdly exhibiting their genitals . . . were necessary for literary or artistic value, a person over the
statutory age who . . . looked younger could be utilized.” Id. at 763.
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First Amendment was designed to include.
In any event, the Court, in creating the definitional rule, was
cognizant of the fact that “laws directed at the dissemination of child
pornography run the risk of suppressing protected expression by
allowing the hand of the censor to become unduly heavy.”307 Thus, it
held that “[t]here are . . . limits on the category of child pornography
[that] . . . is unprotected by the First Amendment.”308 Since “the nature
of the harm to be combated” is the sexual exploitation and abuse of real
children, it is only “works that visually depict sexual conduct . . . [that is
suitably limited and described] by children below a specified age”309 that
is outside the scope of the First Amendment. Consequently, “the
distribution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct [by
minors], not otherwise obscene, which do not involve live performance
or photographic or other visual reproduction of live performances,
retains First Amendment protection.”310 This includes paintings,
computer generated images, as well as film or videos of adults who
appear to be minors.311 Again, the Court seems to have drawn the
definitional line in a very speech protective way.
11. Defamation
Chaplinsky also specifically mentioned libel as one of the
categories of speech that was excluded from the First Amendment.312
However, beginning in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,313 the Court has
created definitional rules that have incorporated a large portion of speech
that injures reputation into the First Amendment. Furthermore, it has
done so mostly based on speech values rather than on a balancing of
interest.314 In Sullivan, the Court held that “[l]ibel can claim no
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations[;] [i]t must be
measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.”315
Government has an obvious interest in compensating its citizens

307. Id. at 756.
308. Id. at 764.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 764-65.
311. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (striking down government’s
attempt to regulate such constitutionally protected speech in the Child Pornography Prevention Act
of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2551 et. seq. (2000)).
312. Chaplinsky, v. New Hamshire, 315 U.S. 568,,571-72 (1942).
313. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964).
314. But see infra notes 328-37 (discussing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
315. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269.
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whose reputations have been injured by falsehoods.316 Under common
law defamation, the injured party may recover compensatory, presumed,
and punitive damages without having to prove fault and without having
to prove actual monetary loss.317 However, the Court in Sullivan held
that the speech values at stake required a definitional “rule that prohibits
a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was
made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”318
The Court reasoned that there was a “profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials.”319 The fear of civil liability might
inhibit free debate by causing speakers to engage in “self censorship.”320
The Court was particularly concerned that critics of public officials not
be “deterred” from voicing their criticism “because of doubt whether it
can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so.”321
Thus, even false statements, which are “inevitable in free debate . . .
must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive.’”322 Therefore, “the
constitutional guarantees require” a limitation on the cause of action in
order to protect “the vigor and . . . the variety of public debate.”323
Subsequently, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Court extended
the Sullivan definitional rule to include public figures as well as public
officials.324 In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren explained
that society “has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of
such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate
about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in
the case of ‘public officials.’”325 “‘[P]ublic figures’ like ‘public
officials’ often play an influential role in ordering society[;] [a]nd . . . as
a class . . . have as ready access as ‘public officials’ to mass media . . . to
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
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See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 949.
See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 267.
Id. 279-80.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.
See Curtis Publ’g Co.v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J. concurring).
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influence policy and to counter criticism of their views and activities.”326
Furthermore, since public officials are not subject “to the restraints of
the political process, . . . public opinion may be the only instrument by
which society can attempt to influence their conduct.”327
Dean Aleinikoff agrees that the Court in Sullivan based its decision
on speech values rather than a comparative balancing of competing
interests.328 However, he has asserted that the opposite was true in the
post Sullivan cases Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.329 and Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 330 His assertion seems correct as to
Gertz, but incorrect as to Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
In Gertz, the Court held that a different definitional rule than that
created in Sullivan was required in defamation cases involving private
persons with respect to matters of public concern. The rule that the Court
created for such cases was that private persons may recover
compensatory damages without having to meet the actual malice
standard required of public figures as long as recovery is not based on
liability without fault.331 However, such plaintiffs must prove actual
malice to recover presumed and punitive damages.332
In drawing this definitional line the Court observed that the First
Amendment value at issue was not the speech itself. False statements of
fact made intentionally or negligently have little First Amendment value
and are “not worthy of constitutional protection.”333 Instead, the speech
value at issue was the “need to avoid self-censorship by the news
media”334 and “to assure the freedoms of speech and press that
‘breathing space’ essential to their fruitful exercise.”335 However, the
Court did not base its decision, that the actual malice standard applicable
to public officials and public figures did not apply to private parties, on
the ground that the speech values at issue are different depending on the
status of the plaintiff. Rather, it reached this decision based on a
recognition of the strong “legitimate state interest in compensating
private individuals for injury to reputation,” as compared to the state’s
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. See Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1001.
329. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); see Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1003
n.327.
330. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); see Aleinikoff,
supra note 11, at 947 n. 21.
331. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48.
332. Id. at 349-50.
333. Id. at 340.
334. Id. at 341.
335. Id. at 342.
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interest in compensating public officials and figures.336 This reasoning
does seem to support Dean Aleinikoff’s position that the Court created
the definitional rule based on a comparative balancing of interests.
However, it is worth noting that the Court did draw the definitional line
as to damages based on First Amendment values. It held that private
parties can only recover presumed and punitive damages upon a showing
of actual malice because they “unnecessarily exacerbate[] the danger of
media self-censorship.”337
However, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., the Court did create the
definitional rule based on speech values rather than on a balancing of
interest. In that case, the Court held that a different definitional line than
those created in Sullivan and Gertz was required in defamation cases
brought by private persons involving matters of private concern.338 It
held that, in such cases, plaintiffs may recover presumed and punitive
damages, as well as compensatory damages, without having to prove
actual malice.339
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Powell’s plurality opinion did
phrase the issue in terms of balancing. He said that to decide the case
“we must . . . balance the State’s interest in compensating private
individuals for injury to their reputations against the First Amendment
interest in protecting . . . expression.”340 Nonetheless, he based his
decision on an interpretation of the First Amendment. He concluded that
“[i]t is speech on ‘matters of public concern’ that is ‘at the heart of the
First Amendment protection[;]’ . . . [i]n contrast, speech on matters of
purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern.”341 The
reason is that with respect to matters of private concern “there is no
threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential
interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self336. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348. The Court concluded that private individuals are in a different
position than public officials and public figures. See id. at 344. They are “more vulnerable to
injury” because the may have less “access” to the media “to counteract false statements.” Id. In
addition, public officials and public figures have assumed “the risk of closer public scrutiny . . .
[and] “the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that . . . [they] have
voluntary exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehoods concerning
them.” Id. at 344-45. Consequently, the Court concluded that less a demanding rule was
appropriate because “private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials
and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery.” Id. at 345.
337. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. However, the Court also said that “punitive damages are wholly
irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a negligence standard for private defamation actions.” Id.
338. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 757-61 (plurality opinion).
339. Id. at 751.
340. Id. at 757.
341. Id. at 758-59.
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government; and there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of selfcensorship by the press.”342 Thus, despite the balancing rhetoric, it
appears that the Court struck the definitional balance between the
competing interests based on First Amendment values, rather than on a
process of comparative balancing.
12. Summary
The Court has implicitly applied definitional balancing as a
methodology for determining whether, and to what the extent, particular
categories of speech are speech in the constitutional sense. In making
this determination, the Court has generally struck the definitional
balance between the competing speech and government interests based
on what it believed to be the First Amendment imperatives at stake,
rather than by a process of comparative balancing. The principal
exceptions to this are the definitional line drawn in Gertz, with respect to
private plaintiffs in cases of public concern, and perhaps in Ferber, with
respect to child pornography, albeit the latter seems more problematical
than the former.343
Furthermore, the Court’s definitional rules have generally expanded
the scope of constitutionally included speech. The Court has excluded
from the First Amendment speech that appropriates private property by
broadcasting an entertainer’s entire act344 and speech that injures the
reputation of private persons on matters of private concern.345 However,
it has held that the First Amendment includes speech that annoys or
offends, provided that it does not amount to an inherently inflammatory
personal insult directed at the hearer that has a tendency to cause a
breach of the peace;346 stirs a hostile audience to anger, invites public
dispute, and brings about a condition of unrest, provided the speaker
does not undertake indictment to riot;347 advocates illegal action,
including overthrowing the United States government by force and
violence, provided that such advocacy is not directed at imminent action
and is not likely to succeed;348 and causes anger and resentment and is

342. Id. at 759-60 (quoting Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359,
1363 (1977)).
343. See supra notes 328-37 and accompanying text (discussing Gertz); supra Part III.B.10.
(discussing Ferber).
344. See supra Part III.B.8.c.
345. See supra notes 338-39 and accompanying text.
346. See supra Part III.B.1.
347. See supra Part III.B.2.
348. See supra Part III.B.3.
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insulting and outrageous, and is perhaps even menacing, such as the Ku
Klux Klan burning a cross, provided such speech does not amount to a
true threat.349
In addition, under the Court’s definitional rules, the First
Amendment includes speech that is offensive, such as F . . . the draft;350
exploits explicit sexual and excretory functions, provided that the speech
does not lack serious literary, artistic, political value;351 and portrays
child pornography, provided the portrayal is not obscene and does not
use a real child.352 Also included is truthful nondeceptive commercial
speech about a lawful product.353
Moreover, speech that injures the reputation of, or inflicts
emotional distress upon, public officials and public figures is speech
within the meaning of the First Amendment, provided that the speaker
does not act with actual malice.354 Other categories of speech that are
deemed to be speech in the constitutional sense are speech that injures
the reputation of a private person on matters of public concern, provided
the speaker acts reasonably, and if not, the speaker is only liable for
compensatory damages, unless he acts with actual malice; 355 and speech
that invades privacy either by placing a person in a false light with
respect to a matter of public concern, unless the speaker acts with actual
malice,356 or discloses private facts, such as disclosing the name of rape
victims, provided it is lawfully obtained truthful information about a
matter of public concern, unless the government has an interest of the
highest order.357 Finally, even if a particular category of speech is
otherwise outside the scope of the First Amendment, government may
not proscribe, or otherwise regulate it, unless the government does so for
the reasons that such speech is proscribable.358
C. Has Definitional Balancing Caused the Court to Include Too Much
or Too Little Speech Within the First Amendment?
Since Chaplinsky, the Court’s definitional rules clearly have
expanded the scope of speech that is included within the First
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
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Amendment. However, there is no shortage of commentators who are
dissatisfied with where the Court has drawn the definitional lines.359
Some think that the Court has not included enough speech;360 others
think the Court has included too much speech.361 For example,
Professor Redish, who is neutral on the “merits” of definitional
balancing,362 has argued “that the constitutional guarantee of free speech
ultimately serves only one true value which [he has] labeled ‘individual
self-realization.’”363 This has led him to the conclusion, among other
things, that obscenity should be included within the First Amendment
because “it is not for external forces – Congress, state legislatures, or the
Court itself – to determine what communications or forms of expression
are of value to the individual; how an individual is to develop his
faculties is a choice for the individual to make.” 364
On the other hand, Professor Heyman, who criticizes definitional
balancing on the ground that it does not provide an adequate explanation
for which speech is included and which speech is excluded from the
First Amendment,365 has argued that the question should be resolved
based on a “rights-based theory of free expression.”366 His “central thesis
is that free speech is a right that is limited by the fundamental rights of
other individuals and the community as a whole.”367 Consequently, “the
First Amendment permits regulation of speech where necessary to
protect the autonomy or rights of others.”368 Thus, under his theory, the
First Amendment would exclude invasions of privacy such as disclosing
the name of rape victims,369 regulations of commercial speech “to
promote the common welfare,”370 “some forms of hate speech,”371 and
359. See sources cited supra note 25.
360. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-16, at 919 (obscenity); Redish, supra note 20, at 63540 (same).
361. See, e.g., Rothchild, supra note 9, at 223-24 (“menacing” speech); Shiffrin supra note 19,
at 1223-51 (discussing various commentators whose theories exclude commercial speech from the
scope of the First Amendment); Sionaioh Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A
Comparison of the American and European Approaches, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305 (1999)
(hate speech).
362. Redish, supra note 20, at 624 n.115.
363. Id. at 593.
364. Id. at 637.
365. See Heyman, supra note 20, at 669-72; Heyman, supra note 11, at 1307-13.
366. Heyman, supra note 11, at 1313. See id. at 1313-69.
367. Id. at 1279.
368. Heyman, supra note 20, at 653.
369. See Heyman, supra note 11, at 1364-66; Heyman, supra note 20, at 685 (“[When viewed]
from a rights-based perspective . . . privacy is no less deserving of protection than is reputation[;]
society should be based on respect for [individual autonomy].”).
370. Heyman, supra note 11, at 1317 n.227 (stating that commercial speech may be regarded
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pornography to the extent that it “unjustifiably violates the right of
others.”372
However, whether the Court has included too much, or too little,
speech is not really a function of definitional balancing. Indeed, even
Professor Nimmer, although touting the benefits of definitional
balancing, thought that the Court had included too little speech with
respect to obscenity,373 but had included too much speech with respect to
false light privacy.374 As others have noted, the methodology can be
applied in either a speech protective or a speech restrictive manner,
depending on who is applying it.375 Definitional balancing requires the
Court to strike a balance between the competing interests based on the
speech values at stake in a given context, but it does not mandate any
particular result. The real quarrel that commentators such as Professors
Heyman and Redish, and for that matter Professor Nimmer, have with
the Court’s definitional line drawing is that the Court has not adopted
their view of First Amendment speech values. If the Court’s view of
such values has caused it to interpret the First Amendment too broadly,

as a “nonfundamental right”).
371. Heyman, supra note 20, at 696. See also id. at 689-99, 710-15; Heyman, supra note 11, at
1375-90.
372. Heyman, supra note 20, at 702. For an analysis similar to Professor Heyman’s see Note,
supra note 20, at 1873, 1858 n.28.
[T]he goal of the first amendment [is] the fullest development of man’s intellect and
spirit [;] . . . ‘definitional balancing’ which would exclude from protection categories of
expression whose social harm outweighs their value . . . is inadequate because it requires
weighing interest of different sorts and violates autonomy of expression by restricting
speech based on its consequences.
Id. Cf. Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 1261, 1251-52 (asserting that “[s]peech is important, but so are the
values of privacy, security, and reputation,” but arguing that the Court “has been right in . . .
balanc[ing] the impact of challenged regulations on first amendment values against the seriousness
of the evil that the state seeks to mitigate”).
373. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 948 n.39 (“One can agree with the method and still believe that
the Court was wrong in drawing the definitional line in such a manner as to completely exclude the
‘obscene’ from first amendment protection.”).
374. Nimmer, supra note 9, 956-67 (discussing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)).
375. See Schauer, Categories, supra note 3, at 303 (“[I]t is important to remember that there is
no necessary correlation between the approach employed and the strength of the first amendment
protection. Although ad hoc balancing has traditionally been associated with a puny first
amendment and categorical rules with a powerful one, it could have been and still could be
otherwise.”); Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 9, at 162 (“[T]here is nothing about
the nature of either [categorical or ad hoc] balancing that would dictate [a particular] result.”);
SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 14 (different people using the same “methodology” can reach different
results). Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293,308 (1992) (“The structural choice between [categorization
and balancing] is neutral as to outcomes; how either is to be used will be driven by a substantive
political theory external to it.”).
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or not broadly enough, definitional balancing as such has not compelled
the result.
D. Is Definitional Balancing an Absolutist Approach that is Too
Inflexible?
As previously noted, Professor Nimmer rejected those absolutist
theories that would include all speech within the First Amendment on
the ground that they were demonstrably false.376 However, definitional
balancing is itself absolutist, but in a different way. One of definitional
balancing’s principal attributes is that it creates rules that can be applied
in later cases without further balancing.377 Speech that falls on one side
of the definitional line is included within the First Amendment; speech
that falls on the other side of the line is excluded.378 In this sense,
definitional balancing does have some of the characteristics of absolutist
theories.379
Professor Schauer has argued that such absolutist theories have the
potential to restrict too much speech.380 Taking the exact opposite view,
Professor Heyman, at least implicitly, has argued that such theories may
protect too much speech.381 However, neither one of their concerns is
bourne out with respect to definitional balancing as a methodology for
defining the First Amendment speech clause. As Part III B herein has
demonstrated, the Court’s application of definitional balancing has
overall expanded the scope of constitutionally included speech, not
restricted it, and as pointed out in Part III C, if the Court has protected
too much speech, or not enough speech, it is not so much a function of
the method, as it is that the Court has had a different view of First
376.
377.
378.
379.

See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 48-64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 120-358 and accompanying text.
For commentators who refer to definitional balancing in absolutist terms, see supra note

16.
380. See Schauer, Categories, supra note 3, at 274-76. Professor Schauer argues as follows:
[One danger of] definitional-absolutist theories . . . is that the criteria of absolutism
exerts an inward pull on the boundaries of coverage. When a problematic case arises, it
is tempting to pull in the boundaries so that the case is now totally outside the perimeter
of the right, thereby eliminating the problem. The danger, however, is that the
boundaries may eventually become far narrower than the underlying theory, resulting in
a constriction of the right no less than if the protection within the boundaries of coverage
had been defeasible within the range.
Id. at 276.
381. See supra notes 365-72 and accompanying text (describing Professor Heyman’s implicit
view that the Court has protected too much speech); Heyman, supra note 11, at 1307-09 (referring
to definitional balancing as a form of absolutism).
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Amendment values than some commentators.
In addition, Dean Aleinikoff has argued, in effect, that the fact that
definitional balancing is somewhat absolutist makes the methodology
too inflexible. He supposes the case of a child pornographer who
“argues that he produces his work with less harm to the child subjects
[than that supposed by the Court in Ferber] and with greater First
Amendment benefits.”382 He says that “[u]nder definitional balancing,
such arguments are ruled out of bounds; these factors supposedly were
considered in deriving the first rule.”383 However, he asks, “[i]f the
pornographer . . . is correct about the harms and benefits of his work,
why should he be burdened by the earlier rule?”384
The problem with Dean Aleinikoff’s analysis is his assumption that
the supposed child pornographer’s work would be excluded from the
First Amendment. Although definitional balancing may be absolutist in
the application of the definitional rules that it creates, it is quite flexible
in the creation of those rules themselves. This is illustrated by the
defamation cases in which the Court has drawn different definitional
lines based on the perceived differences in the underlying facts.385
Consequently, there is no reason to believe that the Court would not be
willing to create a different definitional rule if it were really true that the
nature of the harms to children were different than those articulated in
Ferber.386 Furthermore, the precise definitional rule with respect to
child pornography is that it is only “works that visually depict sexual
conduct” by real children that is considered not to be speech in the
constitutional sense.387 As long as Dean Aleinikoff’s child pornographer
does not use real children, his works are entitled to First Amendment
protection.388

382. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 979.
383. Id.
384. Id. The fact that his hypothetical pornographer might be subject to the original rule
indicates to Dean Aleinikoff that definitional balancing is not “a panacea[,] [and] [a]ny gain in
certainty it provides come at the price of reduced coherence.” Id.
385. See supra notes 312-42 and accompanying text. Dean Aleinikoff recognizes that the
Court has created different definitional rules in the defamation cases based on differences in the
underlying facts, but for him this flexibility indicates that there is little difference between
definitional and ad hoc balancing. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, there
are important differences between the two. See supra notes 39-68, 99-119; infra Part III.E.
386. Cf. Schlag, supra note 16, at 574 n.9 (“Definitional balancing does not provide . . . a
finished product: it remains subject to change if the state interest asserted prove to be novel and
substantially less compelling or substantially more compelling than those state interest asserted in
past balancing acts.”); Wells, supra note 75, at 243 (same, relying on Schlag).
387. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
388. See supra notes 307-11 and accompanying text.
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From an entirely different perspective, Professor Shiffrin insists
that definitional balancing “is overly absolute”389 and is too
“inflexibl[e]”390 to the extent that there is an “absolute preference for
rules391 . . . for everything touching [F]irst [A]mendment freedoms.”392
He agrees that definitional balancing “has some appeal”393 and “that the
absence of rules is costly and that the costs are of [F]irst [A]mendment
importance.”394 Nonetheless, he maintains that “ad hoc balancing is
[not] always wrong.395 In fact, he argues that “in some context, ad hoc
decisionmaking can advance first amendment values more than a regime
of rules is able to do[,]”396 and “sometimes . . . the cost [of not having
rules] are worth absorbing.”397 Whether or not definitional balancing is
the most appropriate methodology for resolving all First Amendment
questions is beyond the scope of this article. However, none of the
instances that Professor Shiffrin cites in support of his assertion involve
the use of definitional balancing in the present context, i.e., as a
technique for drawing definitional lines within categories of speech to
distinguish between speech that is included within the First Amendment
and speech that is excluded so that it may be proscribed based on its
proscribable content.398
E. Are There Really any Practical Differences Between Ad Hoc and
Definitional Balancing?
As previously noted, definitional and ad hoc balancing involve
different types of balancing.399 The former seeks to strike a balance
between speech and government regulatory interests based on First
Amendment values, whereas the latter involves “the identification,
valuation, and . . . head-to-head comparison”400 of the competing
389. SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 12.
390. Id. at 15.
391. Id. at 12.
392. Id. at 15.
393. Id.
394. Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 1253.
395. SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 15.
396. Id.
397. Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 1253.
398. See id. at 1253 nn. 258-60 and accompanying text (referring to Island Trees Free School
Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (removal of books from public school library); Nebraska Press
Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (prior restraint); Branzburg v. Hays, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)
(reporter’s privilege); N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (injunction). See also
SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 15-16 (discussing Branzburg).
399. See supra Part III.A.
400. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 945.
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interests. Nonetheless, some commentators believe that there is little
practical difference between the two.401 For example, Dean Aleinikoff
argues that the fact the Court has created different definitional rules in
the defamation cases, based on differences in the underlying facts,
illustrates “[t]he ‘un-definitionalness’ of ‘definitional balancing.’”402 In
his “view, it is simply a matter of taste whether one views these cases as
illustrations of ‘definitional’ or ‘ad hoc’ balancing.”403 He also makes
the broader assertion, although not in the context of the First
Amendment, that the distinction between the two is “artificial[];” “[i]f
. . . [n]ew situations [that] present new interests and different weights for
old interest . . . are allowed to re-open the balancing process, then every
case becomes one of ‘ad hoc’ balance, establishing a rule for that case
only.”404
In addition, Professor Shiffrin has argued that “the distinction
between rules and ad hoc balancing is not a sharp one in practice”405
because the application of definitional rules requires an ad hoc
analysis.406 He too uses the defamation cases to illustrate his point. He
asserts that the “rule formulated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. . . .
substituting fault for strict liability is in actuality the authorization for ad
hoc balancing.”407 Such balancing is necessary, he argues, to answer
questions such as “[w]hat does it mean to say that plaintiff must show
fault, [and], [a]ssuming that fault is lack of reasonable care, how does
one determine what is reasonable?”408 The answer, he says, is
“[p]resumably, by examining the circumstances of concrete cases, by
making a judgment, by proceeding to compare cases in the future, by
identifying factors to be considered, by forming rules where possible in
concrete contexts - in short by the common law process.”409 Similar ad
hoc judgments are required, he asserts, to determine whether a particular
plaintiff is a public figure who may not recover in a defamation action
without showing actual malice.410
401. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
402. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 980 n.230.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 980-81 (discussing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (Fifth Amendment)).
See also Molnar, supra note 17, at 1369 n. 243 (quoting Professor Aleinikoff).
405. SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 16.
406. See id. at 16-17.
407. Id. (referring to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For a discussion of
Gertz, see supra notes 329-37 and accompanying text).
408. Id.
409. Id. at 16-17.
410. See id. at 17. As Professor Shiffrin says, the application of definitional rules in the
defamation cases does require ad hoc judgments concerning such issues as the standard of care and
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Nevertheless, neither the fact that the Court has created different
definitional rules within subcategories of defamation, nor the fact that
the application of definitional rules requires ad hoc decision making,
means that there are not important differences between ad hoc and
definitional balancing. The differences are the ones that Professor
Nimmer articulated.411 These include the fact that ad hoc balancing
involves a case by case comparative balancing of the speech and
government regulatory interests in the context of the specific facts at
issue, for the purpose of determining which party should prevail in a
given case412 whereas definitional balancing involves striking a balance
between the category of speech at issue and the government’s interest in
regulation, based on First Amendment values, for the purpose of creating
rules that can be applied in later cases.413 As Professor Nimmer said,
such rules are beneficial because they provide a degree of “certainty
[that] minimizes speech deterrence,”414 and provide speakers with “a
standard” to judge whether their speech is within the First
Further, they provide greater protection against
Amendment.415
judicial416 and legislative417 encroachment than does ad hoc balancing
and “can insulate a judge from legally irrelevant pressures to a
considerable degree if the judge wishes such insulation.”418
Additionally, as Professor Nimmer emphasized, definitional rules
have the effect of limiting ad hoc decision making by “narrow[ing] . . .
the . . . question” presented. 419 Professor Schauer has made the same
point. He has noted that determining who is a public figure, for
purposes of applying the definitional rules in defamation cases, “is by no
means an easy task.”420 However, this “variability in what remains to be
decided should not blind us to the extent to which issues have been

whether the plaintiff is a public figure. See supra notes 318-32 and accompanying text. Other
examples where the application of definitional rules requires ad hoc judgments include obscenity
which requires ad hoc judgments concerning whether the work has artistic, political, or scientific
value; and advocacy of illegal action which requires ad hoc judgments as whether the speaker
advocated imminent lawless action and if so whether there was a likelihood of success. See supra
notes 158, 293 and accompanying text.
411. See generally Nimmer, supra note 9, at 939-45.
412. See supra notes 39-42, 78-119 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 43-47, 78-119 and accompanying text.
414. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 945.
415. See id. at 939.
416. See id. at 939-40.
417. Id. at 945.
418. Id.
419. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 952.
420. Schauer, Categories, supra note 3, at 301.
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removed from consideration in the particular case.”421 He says “for
example [a]ll of the [F]irst [A]mendment issues . . . have been
predetermined at the rulemaking level[;] [i]t is not for the court in the
particular case to determine whether the plaintiff has available adequate
fora for a response, or if the particular words spoken are harmful or
helpful to the process of public deliberation.”422 Furthermore, “even the
factual determinations are constrained by rule, at least to the extent that
the concepts of ‘publicness’ and ‘actual malice’ have become more
precise through a combination of rule language and interpretive case
law.”423 Even Professor Shiffrin concedes that although definitional
“[r]ules . . . leave plenty of opportunity for subjective manipulation and
for arbitrary decisionmaking,”424 “[t]hey usually provide more
predictability than ad hoc balancing” and “can confine discretion.”425
Consequently, there really are significant practical differences between
ad hoc and definitional balancing.
F. Should the Term Definitional Balancing be Abandoned Because It Is
Potentially Confusing?
In his treatise, which is the successor to Professor Nimmer’s,426
Professor Smolla has “abandoned . . . [t]he term ‘definitional
balancing’” because it “has not caught on and . . . suffers from using the
word balancing, which can cause confusion with the far less speechprotective ‘ad hoc balancing’ approach.”427 Instead, he uses the term
“heightened scrutiny” to describe the process.428
Properly understood, the term definitional balancing is an accurate
description of the process the Court has used to determine the extent to
which particular categories of speech are speech in the constitutional
sense. It has “defined” the scope of the First Amendment by striking a
“balance” between the competing interests based on its view of the
speech values at stake.429 Nevertheless, there is no question that the term
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 1253.
425. SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 17. Cf. Susan M. Gilles, Public Figures and Private Facts:
Should the “Public Figure” Doctrine Be Transplanted into Privacy Law, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1204,
1238 (2005) (“[T]he presence of rules permits a greater degree of predictability than an
individualized, ad hoc approach where each case is treated as unique.”).
426. See SMOLLA, supra note 22, at ix.
427. Id. § 2:12, at 2-7 & n.1.
428. Id. at 2-7.
429. See supra notes 99-119 and accompanying text.
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has caused confusion. As previously noted, many commentators view
the process as involving a “head-to-head comparison”430 of speech
values and government regulatory interests as in ad hoc balancing, albeit
at a higher level of generalization.431
However, Professor Smolla’s solution is also potentially confusing.
The problem is that it “collapse[s] the important distinction between
coverage and protection.”432 The term “heightened scrutiny” implies
that the question is whether the government’s interest in regulating
constitutionally protected speech survives the applicable level of
scrutiny. By contrast definitional balancing seeks to answer the threshold
question of whether the speech at issue is “speech” that is subject to any
First Amendment scrutiny. Consequently, the proper solution to the
confusion is not to abandon a useful and accurate term in favor of one
that suffers from its own conceptual difficulties. Instead, the proper
solution is to explain the difference to those who might be misled. The
term definitional balancing should not be abandoned.
IV. CONCLUSION
Without explicit acknowledgment, the Court has applied
definitional balancing as a technique for drawing definitional lines
within categories of speech, so as to distinguish between speech that is
included within the First Amendment and speech that is excluded so that
it may be proscribed based on its proscribable content. For the most part,
it has done so in the way that Professor Nimmer described it. It has
recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, that competing speech and
government regulatory interests were at stake but it has struck the
balance between them based on its understanding of First Amendment
values, rather than on a comparison of the competing interests as many
commentators assert.
Furthermore, contrary to the view of many commentators, the Court
has struck the balance between the competing interests in a way that has
expanded the scope of speech included within the First Amendment, not
restricted it. Nonetheless, many commentators are dissatisfied with
where the Court has drawn the definitional lines in particular contexts.
However, definitional balancing is neutral as to outcomes; if the Court
has used definitional balancing to include too much, or too little, speech
within the First Amendment, the methodology as such has not compelled
430. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 945.
431. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
432. Schauer, Categories, supra note 3, at 275-76.
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the result.
Definitional balancing is absolutist in the sense that once the
definitional lines are drawn, speech on one side of the definitional line is
included within the First Amendment and speech on the other side of the
line is excluded. Both types of speech may be regulated, but regulation
of the former must meet First Amendment standards while the regulation
of the latter does not, provided that it is being regulated for the reasons
that such speech is excluded from the First Amendment. Furthermore,
although definitional balancing may be absolutist in the application of
the definitional rules that are created, it is quite flexible in the creation of
the rules themselves; different underlying facts can give rise to different
rules.
The application of definitional rules requires ad hoc judgments but
the creation of the rules themselves does limit the amount of ad hoc
decision making in First Amendment litigation by narrowing the issues
to be decided. The term definitional balancing has caused some
confusion among commentators who view it as a comparison of
competing interests, although at a higher level of generalization than ad
hoc balancing. However, despite the confusion of some, definitional
balancing is an accurate and useful term to describe the Court’s efforts to
“define” the scope of the First Amendment by striking a “balance”
between competing interests based on speech values. As such the term
should be retained.
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